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Introduction
This article examines the increasingly important role of science in the
structure and operation of international trade agreements. Indeed, under
the recently completed Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' (Uru-
guay Round) and the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement 2
(NAFTA), the presence and integrity of scientific support is a principal
touchstone for determining the legitimacy of many national regulatory
efforts aimed at assuring environmental integrity or safeguarding public
health. More particularly, the analysis in this article is intended to high-
light the quiescent issues at the interface between science and governmen-
tal regulatory policies that are raised by the emphasis on scientific validity
in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that international trade
agreements, at least to the extent that they govern national regulatory
measures in the areas of environment and public health, contain primarily
"negative" obligations. That is to say, international trade agreements do
not generally contain affirmative requirements directing national govern-
ments to achieve certain minimum criteria in these areas. Rather, under
the Uruguay Round or the NAFTA, inadequate scientific support for a
national environmental or public health standard may imply that that stan-
dard is unjustified. Consequently, tests of scientific validity in recent inter-
national trade agreements are intended to circumscribe the regulatory
authority of national governments so as to limit the abuse of putatively
"scientific" claims for protectionist purposes, and not to establish mini-
mum benchmarks for protection of the environment and public health.
In other words, the science-based trade disciplines in the Uruguay Round
and the NAFTA are not just good practice standards. Instead, failure to
satisfy those requirements, unless a regulatory measure is based on an
international standard, implies inconsistency with the trade agreement,
triggering the obligation to remove or correct the offending measure.
As currently structured, these multilateral and regional trade agree-
ments invite the application of science at the following principal junctures
addressed in this article:
* in establishing national regulatory standards; and
* in the quasi-adjudicatory panel dispute settlement process.
The application of science in both these contexts involves two principal
tasks that pervade virtually all regulatory activity in the areas of environ-
ment and public health:
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions [hereinafter Uruguay Round], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), substantially
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), and in OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATWE, FINAL
Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTI-
ATIONS (VERSION OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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" the process of analyzing experimental data to determine govern-
mentally established regulatory requirements; and
• the process of crafting national regulatory requirements in the face
of scientific uncertainty.
Examination of these two tasks in both the contexts identified above then
generates two central questions that this article attempts to answer:
" What can reasonably be expected of science and scientists in the
national regulatory process?; and
" In light of the answer to the previous question, what is a reasonable
interpretation of the science-based trade disciplines in the Uruguay
Round and the NAFTA?
The central theme of this article is the necessity for deference to deci-
sion-making processes of national regulatory authorities in the application
of these new trade disciplines and the need for trade-based review of
national regulatory measures to operate within clearly defined limits.
Accordingly, this article first examines and summarizes the relevant texts,
including the original 1947 GATT, the Uruguay Round, and the NAFTA
texts on standards. Next, the article considers the role of science in the
standard-setting process with reference to the copious literature on this
topic. Finally, the article takes up the difficult question of the application
of the science-based trade disciplines in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA
texts in the context of the quasi-adjudicatory trade agreement dispute set-
tlement process.
I. Basic Texts
From the point of view of the role of science in international trade, the
potentially universal trade regime established in 1947 by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GAIT 1947) is of the greatest interest.
The original 1947 instrument has been supplemented by a number of
additional rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. Of particular impor-
tance to the subject of this article are the Tokyo Round, which was com-
pleted in late 1979, and the Uruguay Round, which was completed in late
1993 and signed on April 15, 1994, but which, as of this writing, has yet to
enter into force. As a result of this sequence of multilateral efforts, the
GATT rules now govern an increasingly wide array of substantive issues,
including in the Uruguay Round not only food safety laws4 but also intel-
lectual property rights.5 Also relevant is the regional NAFTA, which
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GAIT, BAsic INsTRUMENTS AND SELEcTED
DOCUMENTS [hereinafter B.I.S.D.], 4th Supp. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GAIT 1947].
4. Agreement on the Application of Sanitaiy and Phytosanitary Measures, GAT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A1A-4 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Uruguay Round SPS Agreement], in Uru-
guay Round, supra note 1.
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, GAT Doc. MTN/FA I-AIC (Dec. 15, 1993), in Uruguay Round, supra
note 1.
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entered into force for Canada, Mexico, and the United States on January
1, 1994.
A. GATE? 1947
As a general matter, national measures directed at preservation of the
environment and protection of public health are subject to the generic
requirements of GATr 1947. Fundamental GATE obligations that apply
in these areas, as in others, include the most-favored-nation principle 6
(non-discrimination among imported products on the basis of their
national origin), national treatment (non-discrimination between foreign
and domestic products),7 and a prohibition on quantitative restrictions for
imports or exports.8
Article XX of GATT 1947 contains a number of exemptions from the
General Agreement for specific categories of national measures. Of par-
ticular importance in the fields of environment and public health are two
express exceptions in article XX of GAIT 1947: one in paragraph (b) for
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;" and
another in paragraph (g) for measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."9 The
two exceptions are to be narrowly construed.' 0 Moreover, in contrast to
6. GAIT 1947, supra note 3, art. I.
7. Id. art. III.
8. Id. art. XI.
9. The relevant passage provides in full as follows:
Article XX
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption[.]
Id. art. XX.
10. See, e.g., United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GAIT, B.I.S.D., 39th Supp.
155, para. 5.22 (1993), 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1619 (1991) [hereinafter United States-Tuna
Dolphin I Panel Report]. In response to a complaint lodged by Mexico, this panel report
addressed an embargo on importation of yellowfin tuna into the United States. The
embargo was designed to encourage foreign states to ensure that vessels under their
jurisdiction conduct tuna fishing operations so as not to kill or injure dolphins. A sec-
ond challenge, initiated by the European Union and the Netherlands, addressed a sec-
ondary import ban designed to discourage "tuna laundering" by intermediary nations
which purchase yellowfin tuna abroad and export it to the United States. United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATr Doc. DS29/R (1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [herein-
after United States-Tuna Dolphin H Panel Report]. Both panels concluded that the
import prohibitions in question were inconsistent with the United States' obligations
pursuant to the GATr. The GAT Council rejected a request by the European Union
to adopt the first panel report, in which Mexico was the complainant. See GATT Council
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the usual situation for resolving disputes over rights in GATT 1947, the
burden is on the respondent whose measure is challenged, rather than on
the complainant, to demonstrate the applicability of one of the enumer-
ated exemptions." The role of overtly scientific considerations in the
jurisprudence of these two exceptions, as elaborated by GATT dispute set-
tlement panels, is discussed in part III.B below.
Entirely apart from any consideration of scientific integrity, the "nec-
essary" requirement with respect to measures to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health has been interpreted by panels as implying a test that
turns on the trade effect of the measure.12 Similarly, the exception for
trade measures to protect exhaustible natural resources has been inter-
preted to require that the standards in question are "primarily aimed at
conservation."1 3 Only one of the environmental, conservation, or public
Refuses EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
353 (Feb. 26, 1992). In a discussion of the second report, the GATT Council is
reported to have rejected a proposal from the United States that would have opened
further Council meetings on that case to the public, and Mexico was said to consider
requesting adoption of the first report. Frances Williams, GATT Shuts Door on Environ-
mentalists, FIN. TIMEs, July 21, 1994, at 6. As of this writing, neither report has been
adopted by the GAT Council and hence neither has yet acquired legal force. SeeWil-
liam J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GAT, 11 FORDHAM INrr'L L.J. 51, 94 (1987).
11. See, e.g., United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT, B.I.S.D., 36th
Supp. 345, para. 5.27 (1990).
12. E.g., United States-Tuna Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 10, para. 5.28 (failure
to "exhaust[ ] all options reasonably available ... through measures consistent with the
General Agreement" implies lack of necessity pursuant to article XX(b)); Thailand-
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GAT, B.I.S.D., 37th Supp.
200, paras. 74-81 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) (import restrictions not justified by
article XX(b) in light of availability of GATT-consistent or less GAT-inconsistent meas-
ures). Cf. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT, B.I.S.D.,
39th Supp. 206, paras. 5.41-.43, 5.52 (1993) (measures relating to import of beer are
not the least trade-restrictive and therefore not "necessary" within meaning of article
XX(d), which exempts "measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regula-
tions which are not inconsistent with" GAT); United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, supra note 11, paras. 5.25-.35 (availability of GAIT-consistent or less GAT-
inconsistent alternatives implies that challenged measures are not "necessary" under
article XX(d)). See generally Steve Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the
Issues, 4 IiNrr'L ENvL. Air. 203, 212-14 (1992) (criticizing "the mutating 'necessary'
test").
13. E.g., United States-Taxes on Automobiles, GAIT Doc. DS31/R, para. 5.64-.65, 33
I.L.M. 1399 (1994) (regulatory scheme requiring manufacturers and importers to meet
minimum average fuel efficiency for all automobiles is intended to promote energy
conservation and therefore is primarily aimed at conservation); United States-Tuna
Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 10, para. 5.27 (measures taken so as to force other
countries to change their policies, and that are effective only if such changes occur, are
not primarily aimed at conservation); United States-Tuna Dolphin I Panel Report, supra
note 10, para. 5.33 (limitations on taking marine mammals by foreign fleets established
with reference to dolphin kills by U.S. vessels not primarily aimed at conservation);
Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GAT, B.I.S.D.,
35th Supp. 98, paras. 4.6-.7 (1989) (requirement that fish be processed domestically
before export is not primarily aimed at conservation and therefore not justified by arti-
cle XX(g)). See text accompanying notes 106-19 infra (discussing panel report under
Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement which concluded that Canadian "landing"
requirement for salmon and herring caught in Canadian waters was not primarily
aimed at conservation).
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health measures examined by dispute settlement panels whose consistency
with GATT turned on the availability of these exceptions have met these
tests. 1
4
B. Tokyo Round Standards Code
In response to the generally perceived failure of the GATT regime to
respond to the problem of non-tariff barriers, an Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, 15 often known as the "Standards Code," was adopted in
1979 as part of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The
Standards Code, which governs mandatory governmentally established
specifications for industrial and agricultural products, is intended to mini-
mize trade distortions that arise from disparate national regulatory
requirements. The Standards Code, which applies only to the thirty-nine
parties to GATT, including the European Union (EU), that currently
accept it, requires parties to use multilaterally agreed standards, where
they exist, as a basis for national measures. 16 The Standards Code also
clearly establishes a requirement of non-discrimination in standards and
their application, both among imported products on the basis of their
national origin and between foreign and domestic products.' 7
The central criterion for determining the validity of a standard under
the Standards Code is whether that standard constitutes an "unnecessary
obstacle to international trade." Although the Standards Code may have
helped in reducing the potential for divergent national regulatory stan-
dards to distort trade as non-tariff barriers, the core test for an "unneces-
sary obstacle"-i.e., an unacceptable standard-was not clearly articulated.
Unlike other key terms like "standard," "unnecessary obstacle" is not
defined in the Standards Code. The text does not expressly distinguish
between unnecessary and necessary regulations, but instead
recognizes implicitly that there may be "necessary" obstacles. Much time
was spent on this formulation, and the end result is not entirely satisfactory.
While subsequent provisions in the Code may be taken as providing gui-
dance on what may be considered as "necessary" the fact remains that these
provisions are likely to give rise to considerable difficulties of interpretation
in practice: the complaining party will have either to prove deliberate pro-
tectionist intent, or to demonstrate that the measure went beyond what was
.necessary[."18
14. United States-Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 13. But cf United States-Tuna
Dolphin II Panel Report supra note 10; United States-Tuna Dolphin I Panel Report, supra
note 10; Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note
12; Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, supra note 13;
United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT,
B.I.S.D., 29th Supp. 91 (1983).
15. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, GAIT,
B.I.S.D., 26th Supp. 8 (1980) [hereinafter Standards Code].
16. Id. art. 2.2.
17. Id. art. 2.1.
18. RW. Middleton, The GATT Standards Code 14 J. WoRta T s E L. 201, 206
(1980).
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The Standards Code contains special dispute resolution procedures that
anticipate the establishment of technical expert groups, which are created
by and advise dispute settlement panels.' 9 As of this writing, there is no
panel jurisprudence interpreting the meaning of "unnecessary obstacle"
within the meaning of the Standards Code.20
C. Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT, com-
pleted in December 1993, contains two new texts addressing standards rel-
evant to the protection of environment and public health: (1) an
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(Uruguay Round SPS Agreement) 2 ' addressing such domestic regulations
as those designed to protect the food supply from contamination; and (2)
an Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Uruguay Round TBT
Agreement),22 which elaborates the earlier Tokyo Round Standards Code
for standards other than sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
1. Agreement on the Application of Sanitay and Phytosanitarj Measures
The Uruguay Round SPS Agreement governs a particular and specific cat-
egory of measures known as "sanitary and phytosanitary standards,"28
19. Standards Code, supra note 15, paras. 14.9-14.12, Annex 2.
20. See, e.g, Eliza Patterson, International Efforts to Minimize the Adverse Trade Effects of
National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations, 24J. WoRID TRADE, Apr. 1990, at 91, 95.
In a domestic proceeding in the United States, Canada filed a brief amicus curiae sup-
porting a Canadian mining company and a number of Canadian trade unions that chal-
lenged a United States regulation banning the manufacture, importation, processing,
and distribution in commerce of most asbestos-containing products. Canada argued
that, because it was not supported by sufficient scientific evidence, the regulation was
an unnecessary obstacle to trade within the meaning of the Standards Code. Brief for
Amicus Curiae Government of Canada at 16-19, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). Although concluding that
the regulation was not valid on domestic legal grounds, the court in the United States
determined that Canada's arguments based on the Standards Code could not be enter-
tained in the domestic tribunal. Id. at 1211 n.8. See generaUy Kyle E. McSlarrow, Interna-
tional Trade and the Environment: Building a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 21 ENvrL. L.
REP. 10,589 (1991) (discussing Canadian challenge to U.S. asbestos regulation).
21. Uruguay Round SPS Agreemen supra note 4.
22. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-6 (Dec. 15,
1993) [hereinafter Uruguay Round TBT Agreement], in Uruguay Round, supra note 1.
23. Paragraph 1 of Annex A of the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement defines "sani-
tary or phytosanitary measure" as:
Any measure applied:
- to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Mem-
ber from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests,
diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
- to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or dis-
ease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
- to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member
from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products
thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
- to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Cornell International Law Journal
defined by the objective of the measure and the type of product regulated.
The principal regulations of concern regarding human health are those
that restrict additives, pesticides, and other contaminants in order to pro-
tect the integrity of the food supply. Unlike the earlier Tokyo Round Stan-
dards Code, the new text on sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be
accepted by contracting parties as part of the overall Uruguay Round pack-
age, including the newly created World Trade Organization 24 (WTO).
A serious disagreement between the United States and the European
Union over hormone-treated beef, now nearly a decade in duration, moti-
vated much of this text, which is designed to prevent the abuse of sanitary
and phytosanitary measures as non-tariff barriers to trade. As ofJanuary 1,
1988, the European Union banned the use of growth hormones in the
breeding of cattle and the sale of beef, including imported beef, treated
with growth hormones. The United States, where such hormones are per-
mitted, has strongly objected to the ban as a non-tariff barrier to trade
unsupported by scientific evidence.25 This controversy has never reached
a GAIT dispute settlement panel.
Although formally governed by the 1979 Tokyo Round Standards
Code, the sub-category of sanitary and phytosanitary measures received
particular attention in the Uruguay Round. One important motivation for
this segmentation appears to have been the prominence of the U.S.-EU
beef hormone dispute. Another was the close nexus between broader
agricultural issues and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which led to
the treatment of the latter within the broader context of agriculture in the
Uruguay Rqund.26 Finally, sanitary and phytosanitary measures were
thought to raise difficulties distinct from those associated with technical
standards generally, including the greater importance of scientific assess-
ment of risk, a wide variety of national approaches to standard setting in
the area of health, and the crucial role of national regulatory authorities
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regula-
tions, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria;
processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and
approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant requirements
associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials neces-
sary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical meth-
ods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and
labelling requirements directly related to food safety.
Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, supra note 4.
24. See Agreement Establishing the Multilateral [World] Trade Organization, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA II (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 15 (1994), in Uruguay Round, supra note 1.
25. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (7) (C) (1988) (identifying as a principal negotiat-
ing objective of the United States in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA "eliminating
and reducing substantially ... unjustified phytosanitary and sanitary restrictions"). See
generally Steven J. Rothberg, Note, From Beer to BST Circumventing the GA7T Standards
Code's Prohibition on Unnecessaty Obstacles to Trade; 75 Mmmu. L Ray. 505 (1990); Michael
B. Froman, Recent Developments, The United States-European Community Hormone Treated
Beef Conflict, 30 HARv. INT'L LJ. 549 (1989); Adrian Rafael Halpern, The U.S.-EC Hor-
mone Beef Controversy and the Standards Code: Implications for the Application of Health Regula-
tions to Agricultural Trade 14 N.C.J. Irr'L L. & Com. RmG. 135 (1989).
26. See 1 THE GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 141-42
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
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in determining the need for action and in choosing preventive or reme-
dial measures in this area.2 7 As a consequence, sanitary and phytosanitary
standards have been "split off' from the larger generic issues associated
with technical standards and are treated in a separate agreement in the
Uruguay Round that emphasizes scientific validity to a considerably
greater extent than the broader new Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade.
Accordingly, scientific tests lie at the core of the trade disciplines
established in the new Uruguay Round SPS Agreement. The final Uru-
guay Round text specifies that sanitary and phytosanitary measures must
be "based on scientific principles and.., not maintained without suffi-
cient scientific evidence." 28 National measures that conform to interna-
tional standards, such as those established by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, are presumptively valid.
29
27. See Patterson, supra note 20, at 95-96.
28. Uruguay Round SPS Agreenent supra note 4, para. 6.
29. Id. para. 10. The new agreement specifically references a number of interna-
tional standard setting bodies, of which the most important from the point of view of
protecting human health is the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The Commission was
created in 1962 as a joint undertaking of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The Commission, membership in
which is open to all FAO and WHO member states and now numbers more than 130,
has a dual function: "protecting the health of the [sic] consumers and ensuring fair
practices in the food trade." Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, art. 1,
para. a, repfinted in CODEx AUMENTARrS CoMMIssION, PROCEDURAL MANUAL 5 (1993).
To this end, the Commission is specifically charged with adopting advisory multilateral
"good practice" standards on such matters as the composition of food products, food
additives, labelling, food processing techniques, and inspection of foodstuffs and
processing facilities. As of 1993, Codex had evaluated 187 pesticides, 523 food addi-
tives, and 57 food contaminants and established 3,019 maximum residue limitations for
pesticides. ROGER W. MiLtER, THIS Is CODEX AuMETrAmus (1993).
From the point of view of this article, Codex activities fall in the realm of harmoniza-
tion and international standard setting and involve both risk assessment and risk man-
agement functions. See text accompanying notes 62-66 infra. The Commission's
Secretariat recently released a paper on the role of science in the Codex decision mak-
ing process. That paper recommends
" clearly distinguishing between risk assessment and risk management in the
Codex process and regularizing data analysis and risk assessment
methodologies;
" improving the transparency of the Codex decision making process by identi-
fying publicly available scientific data, clearly explaining the methodology
used to evaluate risk, plainly identifying social policy choices such as the
acceptable level of protection underlying a particular standard, and provid-
ing a narrative statement of scope and purpose to accompany each standard;
" distinguishing between those standards intended for the protection of public
health and those for other purposes, including prevention of unfair trade;
" adopting a "sunset" rule specifying that Codex standards are valid for no less
than 20 years to assure reevaluation of Codex standards in light of new scien-
tific developments. Existing Codex standards would expire within 10 years;
and
" ensuring that Codex standards are "no more restrictive of trade than neces-
sary to achieve legitimate interests, taking into account technical and admin-
istrative aspects of implementation."
Codex Alimentarius Commission Doc. CX/GP 94/4. An earlier paper on risk assess-
ment procedures used by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its subsidiary and
Cornell International Law Journal
The Uruguay Round SPS Agreement introduces the concept of a
WTO member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protec-
tion.3 0 Although the choice of appropriate level of protection appears to
be the unilateral prerogative of each WTO member state, the level of pro-
tection must "take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade
effects."3 1 Moreover, each party is to "avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
tinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations,
if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade."3 2 In a somewhat obscure passage, guidelines for
implementing this requirement to be considered subsequently by the
WTO members "shall take into account ... the exceptional character of
human health risks to which people voluntarily expose themselves,"33 a
category which presumably includes tobacco. Somewhat incoherently, this
requirement appears to imply that the level of protection from involuntary
or unknowing exposures to contaminants in food that a WTO member
country decides to provide to all its citizens should be determined by refer-
advisory bodies, prepared by a consultant, documented variability in risk assessment
methodologies within Codex and recommended standardization of Codex's overall
approach to formal risk assessment. Codex Alimentarius Commission Doc. ALINORM
93/37.
Codex's treatment of carcinogenic pesticides has been compared to the system
employed in the United States at the national level as follows:
The EPA [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency] employs a quantitative risk
procedure for evaluating pesticides that may be carcinogenic. With noncarci-
nogenic pesticides, a threshold level (no observed effects level) is identified
which then serves as the basis for establishing an ADI [acceptable daily intake].
With carcinogenic pesticides, the EPA assumes that there is no threshold level
but rather, a probability of risk exists at any level of exposure.
The focus of the EPA's assessment is to determine if an acceptable level of
risk exists for the pesticide. This is accomplished by applying multistage mathe-
matical models to available dose/response test data and taking into account the
weight of evidence concerning carcinogenicity. The result is the calculation of
human risk probabilities. A risk of one in a million is considered acceptable
under certain conditions.
The [Codex] uses basically the same procedures for interpreting carcino-
genic data as in evaluating other toxic effects of pesticides. It may use a larger
safety factor when recommending an ADI level for pesticides where carcino-
genic risk is apparent. In cases where a no observed effects level cannot be
clearly established and the carcinogenic risk is high, there would be cause for
not recommending an ADI.
UNITED STATES GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFIcE, INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY:. COMPARI-
SON OF U.S. AND CODEX PESTICIDES STANDARDS 24 (1991) (footnote omitted) [hereinaf-
ter INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY].
30. Uruguay Round SPSAgreement, supra note 4, Preamble para. 6, paras. 11, 14, 18,
19, 20, 21, 29, 32, 41 & Annex B, para. 2.1(c). Noting that "[m]any Members... refer
to this concept as the 'acceptable level of risk,'" paragraph 5 of Annex A defines
"[alppropriate [l]evel of [s]anitary or [pihytosanitary [p]rotection" as "[t]he level of
protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory."
31. Id. para. 19.
32. Id. para. 20.
33. Id. para. 20. Cf infra text accompanying note 127 (GATr panel finding that
"smoking constitute[s] a serious risk to human health").
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ence to the level of risk to which certain individuals, such as smokers, vol-
untarily and knowingly choose to expose themselves.
A WTO member state may adopt measures more stringent than inter-
national standards to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosani-
tary protection, so long as those measures are supported by "a scientific
justification." 4 This passage apparently is intended to assure that WTO
member states may adopt measures more stringent than harmonized
international standards, but only so long as those national measures are
grounded in sound science. It is by no means obvious, however, that
"good science" can be defined with precision in the abstract.
The text of the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement mirrors this deeply
rooted difficulty. The use of the term "scientific justification" in the so-
called "Dunkel Draft," an interim negotiating text of the Uruguay Round
produced in December 1991,3 5 was controversial in some quarters because
of its potential implication of a rigorous cause-and-effect nexus between
empirical scientific evidence and the national regulatory measure cho-
sen.3 6 The final Uruguay Round SPS Agreement elaborates the meaning
of this term, as the Dunkel Draft did not, by explaining that "there is a
scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of
available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions
of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international
standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its
appropriate level of protection."
3 7
Although apparently intended to clarify the text, this insertion adds
another layer of interpretational difficulty. This passage links a party's
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection with the concepts
of "scientific justification" and "available scientific information." The foot-
note consequently might be taken to suggest, as the rest of the text does
not, that there are scientific constraints on the choice of appropriate level
of protection, a risk management decision that reflects social value choices
distinct from the scientific process of risk assessment38
Contracting parties are required to assure that sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures are "based on" a risk assessment.3 9 In performing this risk
assessment, governments must "tak[e] into account risk assessment tech-
34. Uruguay Round SPSfAgreement supra note 4, para. 11.
35. Draft Fnal Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations (Dunkel Draft), GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, sec. L, pt. C, para. 11, at L.37
(Dec. 20, 1991), repinted in "TH-E DuNEL DR" FROM THE GATT SECRETARIAT L.35
(Institute for International Legal Information ed., 1992).
36. See section II.B infra (discussing precautionary approaches).
37. Uruguay Round SPS Agreement supra note 4, para. 11 & n.2.
38. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
39. Uruguay Round SPS Agreement supra note 4, para. 16. Paragraph 4 of Annex A to
the agreement defines "risk assessment" as
[t] he evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or
disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary
or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated poten-
tial biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential
for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of
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niques developed by the relevant international organizations" 40 and "take
into account available scientific evidence."4 1 In cases of scientific uncer-
tainty or inadequate data "where relevant scientific evidence is insuffi-
cient," WTO member states "may provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information."42
2. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
The Uruguay Round also contains an Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (Uruguay Round TBT Agreement) which elaborates the require-
ments of the Tokyo Round Standards Code for technical regulations and
standards,43 except for sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are
covered under the Uruguay Round agreement on that subject. Unlike the
earlier Standards Code, this new agreement is an integral component of
the Uruguay Round that must be accepted by all GAIT contracting parties
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, feedstuffs
and beverages.
Id. Annex A, para. 4.
40. Id para. 16. Partially because of lack of standardization in the definitions of
"risk assessment" and "risk management," as discussed in part IIA infra, harmonization
of risk assessment methodologies has not proceeded especially quickly. For chemical
risks, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
undertaken to harmonize risk assessment methodologies, particularly with respect to
pesticides, and has published guidelines for the testing of chemicals. The International
Programme on Chemical Safety, a joint project of the World Health Organization
(WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), has also undertaken work in this area. Although not strictly
international, there is also a considerable body of experience with risk assessment in
the European Union, which has recently resulted in the adoption of common princi-
ples and methodologies as applied to certain dangerous substances. See, e.g., Commis-
sion Directive 93/67/EEC of 20July 1993 Laying Down the Principles for Assessment of
Risks to Man and the Environment of Substances Notified in Accordance with Council
Directive 67/548/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 227) 9. For a comparison of risk assessment meth-
odologies in OECD countries, see generally UNrrED STATES GENERAL AccOUNTING OFmCE,
PESTrcmEs: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDusTRIALIzED NATIONS' REGULATORY SYSTEMS 58-
69 (1993) [hereinafter PFS-ncmEs: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS'
REGULATORY SvsTE.Ms].
41. Uruguay Round SPS Agreemen4 supra note 4, para. 17.
42. Id. para. 22. Other salient disciplines include a requirement that sanitary and
phytosanitary measures be "necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life
or health," id. para. 5, and that such measures are "applied only to the extent necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health." Id. para. 6. Sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures must not "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members
where identical or similar conditions prevail" and must not "be applied in a manner
which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade." Id. para. 7. Par-
ticular sanitary and phytosanitary measures may not be "more trade restrictive than
required to achieve [a WTO member's] appropriate level of protection, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility." Id. para. 21 (footnote omitted). The
choice of a sanitary or phytosanitary measure must also reflect economic considerations
for measures ihtended to protect animal or plant life or health. Id. para. 18.
43. The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement is somewhat broader in coverage than the
Tokyo Round Standards Code. The new agreement specifies that it applies to both
mandatory and advisory requirements not only for products, but also for "related
processes and production methods." Uruguay Round TBT Agreemen supra note 22,
Annex 1, paras. 1-2.
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that adhere to the new Round. As in the case of the Tokyo Round Stan-
dards Code, the new agreement establishes trade disciplines to distinguish
those domestic standards, including those designed to preserve the envi-
ronment and to protect public health, that could act as non-tariff barriers
to trade.
Anecdotal reports suggest that one motivation for the Uruguay
Round TBT Agreement is the increasing "internationalization" of manu-
facturing processes. For example, component parts of such products as
automobiles may be manufactured by, or to the specifications of, multina-
tional corporations in a variety of countries and cross national boundaries
any number of times before the finished goods are placed on the market.
The new TBT Agreement could potentially apply to a wide variety of regu-
latory requirements that have environmental or public health implica-
tions, but that are not sanitary or phytosanitary standards. Specifications
for consumer products and children's toys, appliance efficiency criteria,
and vehicle fuel efficiency standards might all be governed by the Uruguay
Round TBT Agreement.
As discussed above, unlike the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, the
new technical barriers agreement contains no scientifically-based trade dis-
ciplines. Like the Tokyo Round Standards Code, the Uruguay Round
TBT Agreement articulates a basic test of non-discrimination and retains
the central notion of an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. This
latter concept is elaborated by the requirement that product standards
"shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective," such as protection of the environment or public health. 44 Also
like the earlier Standards Code, the new text encourages the use of inter-
national standards where they exist.45 Because of the much broader range
of legitimate objectives, such as consumer protection, in standards cov-
ered by the new TBT Agreement, and in distinct contrast to the Uruguay
Round SPS Agreement, national regulations that are more stringent or
rigorous than comparable international standards need not meet a scien-
tific test.
D. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement 46 entered into force
for Canada, Mexico, and the United States onJanuary 1, 1994. An earlier
bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States entered into
force on January 1, 1989.4 7 The operation of the Canada-U.S. agreement,
however, has been suspended for so long as the NAFTA remains in
44. Id. art. 2.2.
45. I. art. 2.4 & Annex 3, para. F. The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement, like the
Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, articulates the concept of a "level of protection" cho-
sen by each state member. I. preamble para. 5 & Annex 3, para. F.
46. NAFTA, supra note 2.
47. Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988,
Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CUSFTA].
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effect.48 Consequently, the earlier bilateral agreement may shed some
light on regional practice in North America, but the NAFTA is the opera-
tive instrument currently governing trade among these three North Amer-
ican countries. The NAFTA, like the Uruguay Round, contains distinct
provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers
to trade. Although both these issues were considered in the Uruguay
Round negotiations before the formal NAFTA negotiations began, the
NAFTA was adopted first. Accordingly, prior developments in the Uru-
guay Round informed the NAFTA texts, which themselves then influenced
the final form of the Uruguay Round agreements.
1. Sanitary and Phytosanitaty Measures
Like the Uruguay Round text, chapter 7 of the NAFTA contains specific
provisions governing sanitary and phytosanitary measures49 as a specific
category of standards. Similar to the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, the
NAFTA encourages the use of internationally agreed standards and
declares that those standards are presumptively valid.50 By comparison
with the Uruguay Round, the NAFTA is somewhat more explicit about a
party's right to establish its own "appropriate levels of protection" 5 1 and to
48. See Statement of Administrative Action, North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, at 8 (1993), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
450, 457 (1993).
49. The NAFTA defines "sanitary or phytosanitary measure" as follows:
a measure that a Party adopts, maintains or applies to:
(a) protect animal or plant life or health in its territory from risks arising
from the introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease,
(b) protect human or animal life or health in its territory from risks aris-
ing from the presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-
causing organism in a food, beverage or feedstuff,
(c) protect human life or health in its territory from risks arising from a
disease-causing organism or pest carried by an animal or plant, or a
product thereof, or
(d) prevent or limit other damage in its territory arising from the intro-
duction, establishment or spread of a pest,
including end product criteria; a product-related processing or production
method; a testing, inspection, certification or approval procedure; a relevant
statistical method; a sampling procedure; a method of risk assessment; a pack-
aging and labelling requirement directly related to food safety;, and a quaran-
tine treatment, such as a relevant requirement associated with the
transportation of animals or plants or with material necessary for their survival
during transportation ....
NAFrA, supra note 2, art. 724.
50. Id. art. 713, paras. 1, 2.
51. Id. art. 712, para. 2. Article 724 defines "appropriate level of pro'tection" as "the
level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health in the territory of a Party
that the Party considers appropriate." Id. Like the Uruguay Round, the NAFTA sug-
gests that the level of protection "minimiz[e] negative trade effects." Id. art. 715, para.
3(a). Like the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, the analogous NAFTA text requires
parties to ensure that they "avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in... levels [of
protection] in different circumstances, where such distinctions result in arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination against a good of another Party or constitute a disguised
restriction on trade between the Parties." Id. para. 3(b).
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implement measures more stringent than international standards.5 2
Those measures more stringent than international standards must be:
" "based on scientific principles... ;"
* "not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis...;"
and
" "based on a risk assessment .... 53
Risk assessments supporting national sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ures must take into account international risk assessment methodologies
and "relevant scientific evidence."54 As in the Uruguay Round SPS Agree-
ment, NAFTA parties may provisionally adopt a sanitary or phytosanitary
measure "on the basis of available relevant information" when "available
relevant scientific evidence or other information is insufficient to com-
plete the [risk] assessment."55
2. Technical Barriers to Trade: Standards-Related Measures
Chapter 9 of the NAFTA contains trade disciplines for regulatory stan-
dards56 other than sanitary and phytosanitary measures that are analogous
to those found in the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement and the Tokyo
Round Standards Code. As in the case of the other standards related texts
in the Uruguay Round and the NAF7A, this passage establishes the pre-
sumptive validity of internationally agreed standards when applied as
national measures57 and articulates a party's right to establish its own
more demanding level of protection in pursuing "legitimate objectives"
such as protection of the environment, consumer safety, or public
health.5 8
52. 1& art. 712, para. 1.
53. Id. para. 3. Article 724 defines "scientific basis" as "a reason based on data or
information derived using scientific methods." The same article defines a "risk assess-
ment" as
an evaluation of:
(a) the potential for the introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or
disease and associated biological and economic consequences; or
(b) the potential for adverse effects on human or animal life or health
arising from the presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-
causing organism in a food, beverage or feedstuff;
Id. art. 724.
54. Id. art. 715, para. 1 (a), (b). As in the case of the Uruguay Round SPS Agree-
ment, the NAFTA text on sanitary and phytosanitary measures establishes additional
disciplines not directly related to science. So, for instance, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures must be non-discriminatory, id. art. 712, para. 4, may not operate as disguised
restrictions on trade, id. para. 6, must be "necessary for the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health," id para. 1, and may be "applied only to the extent
necessary to achieve [a party's] appropriate level of protection," id. para. 5.
55. Id. art. 715, para. 4.
56. Id. art. 901. Like the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement, the NAFTA text on tech-
nical barriers applies to both mandatory and advisory requirements not only for prod-
ucts, but also for "related processes and production methods." Id. art. 915.
57. Id. art. 905, para. 2.
58. Id. art. 904, para. 2. Article 915 specifies that
legitimate objective includes an objective such as:
(a) safety,
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Unlike the Uruguay Round and NAFTA SPS texts, national regula-
tions more stringent than international standards can be, but are not
required to be, justified by means of scientific data and analysis. Conse-
quently, a party "may... conduct an assessment of risk... tak[ing] into
account... available scientific evidence or technical information." 9 In
cases of incomplete or unavailable data, as in the case of the Uruguay
Round SPS Agreement, a party may adopt a provisional regulation until
the scientific uncertainty is reduced or eliminated. 60
U. Science and the National Regulatory Process
The Uruguay Round and the NAFTA texts on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures purport to apply scientifically-based trade disciplines to the
domestic process of adopting regulatory measures in the area of public
health and food and drug safety. Because these new trade disciplines
establish constraints on domestic regulatory processes designed to pre-
clude protectionist abuse of national measures, the effects of those new
requirements in turn depend on the role of science in regulatory
processes in these areas.61
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environ-
ment or consumers, including matters relating to quality and
identifiability of goods or services, and
(c) sustainable development,
considering, among other things, where appropriate, fundamental climatic or
other geographical factors, technological or infrastructural factors, or scientific
justification but does not include the protection of domestic production....
Id. art. 915.
59. Id. art. 907, para. 1(a). Article 915 defines "assessment of risk" as an "evaluation
of the potential for adverse effects." Id. art. 915.
60. I art. 907, para. 3. Like the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement, the analogous
NAFTA text articulates a basic test of non-discrimination, id. art. 904, para. 3, and
retains the core test of an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. Id. para. 4.
The Canada-U.S. bilateral agreement contains a passage addressing technical stan-
dards that specifies that
[n]either Party shall maintain or introduce standards-related measures or pro-
cedures for product approval that would create unnecessary obstacles to trade
between the territories of the Parties. Unnecessary obstacles to trade shall not
be deemed to be created if-
a) the demonstrable purpose of such measure or procedure is to achieve a
legitimate domestic objective; and
b) the measure or procedure does not operate to exclude goods of the
other Party that meet that legitimate domestic objective.
CUSFTA, supra note 47, art. 603. "[L]egitimate domestic objective" is defined as "an
objective whose purpose is to protect health, safety, essential security, the environment,
or consumer interests." Id. art 609. While there is no panel jurisprudence on the
meaning of "unnecessary obstacles to trade" under the bilateral agreement, Canada
relied on this passage in challenging the United States asbestos ban in a domestic U.S.
tribunal. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
61. Scientific analyses are obviously relevant not only to regulatory measures
designed to protect public health, but also to national efforts to address environmental
and ecological effects. However, as discussed above, the Uruguay Round scientifically-
based trade disciplines are confined to the area of sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
which are the only category of standards for which the NAFMA mandates risk assess-
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A. Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Science Policy
One fundamental axiom admonishes that regulations to protect public
health involve social policy choices. 62 Because the regulatory process is
not wholly scientific, science does not have all the answers. There is no
way to infer regulatory outcomes solely on the basis of scientific data, espe-
cially when most regulations are implicitly or explicitly crafted to respond
to a particular social, economic, or political context. While scientific anal-
ysis can provide assistance in attaining a given public health goal, the
choice of that goal reflects societal values as to which science may provide
little, if any, guidance. In other words, science may inform the regulatory
process but cannot, by itself, determine the result with particularity. For
instance, a risk assessment may help in setting a standard designed to limit
the probability that an individual will develop cancer after a lifetime of
exposure to a particular chemical substance to no more than one chance
in a million. By contrast, the choice of the one-in-a-million goal-as
opposed to, say, zero or one-in-a-thousand-is one of public policy.
Although by no means universally accepted,63 one approach that
expressly acknowledges this dichotomy prescribes a bifurcation of the reg-
ulatory process into two phases: "risk assessment," which in principle
establishes the strictly scientific basis for regulatory action, and "risk man-
agement," which is the multidisciplinary process of choosing regulatory
measures:
Risk assessment is an exercise that combines available data on a substance's
potency in causing adverse health effects with information about likely
human exposure, and through the use of plausible assumptions, it gener-
ates an estimate of human health risk. Risk management is the process by
which a protective agency decides what action to take in the face of such
estimates. Ideally the action is based on such factors as the goals of public
health and environmental protection, relevant legislation, legal precedent,
ments. For this reason, the remainder of this analysis addresses the role of science
primarily in the context of regulation to protect public health and addresses regulation
of environmental and ecological effects only to the extent the context indicates.
62. A former Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
quotes Alvin Weinberg's influential and trenchant observation as follows:
Attempts to deal with social problems through the procedures of science hang
on the answers to questions that can be asked of science and yet which cannot
be answered by science. I propose the term trans-scientific for these ques-
tions.... Scientists have no monopoly on wisdom where this kind of trans-
science is involved; they shall have to accommodate the will of the public and its
representatives.
William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, andDemocracy, ISsuEs Sci. & TECH., Spring 1985, at
19, 26 (emphasis in original) (quoting Alvin Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10
MrNERvA 209, 222 (1972)).
63. For critical observations with respect to the risk assessment/risk management
bifurcation, see, e.g., ACCEPTABLE EvmENcE: SCIENCE Am VALUEs IN RISK AssEssMENT
(Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991); CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING
Toxic SuBsrANcEs: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAw (1993); Ellen Silbergeld,
The Uses and Abuses of Scientific Uncertainty in Risk Assessmen4 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Fall 1986, at 17.
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and application of social, economic, and political values. 64
In this two stage methodology, scientific questions can be isolated and
addressed in an objective matter through risk assessment methodologies
at the beginning of the regulatory process. But the allegedly scientific pro-
cess of risk assessment necessarily requires inferences, choices, and
assumptions that themselves reflect policy preferences, an area sometimes
known as "science policy."65
64. Ruckelshaus, supra note 62, at 28. Another influential publication has
described the distinction as follows:
We use risk assessment to mean the characterization of the potential adverse
health effects of human exposures to environmental hazards. Risk assessments
include several elements: description of the potential adverse health effects
based on an evaluation of results of epidemiologic, clinical, toxicologic, and
environmental research; extrapolation from those results to predict the type
and estimate the extent of health effects in humans under given conditions of
exposure; judgments as to the number and characteristics of persons exposed
at various intensities and durations; and summary judgments on the existence
and overall magnitude of the public-health problem. Risk assessment also
includes characterization of the uncertainties inherent in the process of infer-
ring risk.
The term risk assessment is often given narrower and broader meanings than
we have adopted here. For some observers, the term is synonymous with quanti-
tative risk assemment and emphasizes reliance on numerical results. Our broader
definition includes quantification, but also includes qualitative expressions of
risk. Quantitative estimates of risk are not always feasible, and they may be
eschewed by agencies for policy reasons. Broader uses of the term than ours
also embrace analysis of perceived risks, comparisons of risks associated with
different regulatory strategies, and occasionally analysis of the economic and
social implications of regulatory decisions-functions that we assign to risk
management.
COMMITTEE ON THE INSTrrUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO Puuc HEALTH,
COMMISSION ON LIFE SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. MANAGING THE PROCESS 18 (1983) (emphasis in original) [here-
inafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
65. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 64, at 28-37 (analyzing scien-
tific and policyjudgments in risk assessment); CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT. IMPROVING REGULATORY
DECISION MAMNG 78 (1993) (noting that "[r]isk assessment can be most useful when
those who rely on it to inform the risk management process understand its nature and
its limitations, and use it accordingly"); John P. Dwyer, Limits of Environmental Risk
Assessmen 116J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 231 (1990) ("The enormous scientific uncertain-
ties at each stage of risk assessment ... make quantifying risks impossible without mak-
ing value-laden, simplifying assumptions. As a result, environmental risk assessment
often does not provide scientific guidance for regulatory decisions."); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy
Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979). See also
JOHN STONEHOUSE &JOHN MUMFORD, SCIENCE, RSK ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PoL-
icy DECISIONS (United Nations Environment Programme Environment and Trade
Series 1994) (observing that, because risk is a composite concept of objective
probability and subjective evaluation, a distinction between the purely scientific task of
risk assessment and the objective, but not scientific, process of "risk evaluation" can be
made). While some of the choices in risk assessments involve trans-scientific decisions,
the options are usually drawn from some scientific basis-e.g., extrapolation from
animal to human dosimetry. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT
IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994).
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Pure policy choices are supposedly confined to the second place, risk
management. At this stage, science may be relevant for such tasks as evalu-
ating technical options. Risk management decisions, however, also
engage other considerations, most notably social values.66 Regulatory pol-
icy, then, is not exclusively the domain of scientists, but of public authori-
ties who make judgments about how to achieve social goals that are
informed by scientific data and scientific inferences.
Because the recently adopted texts on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures and technical barriers to trade in the Uruguay Round and the
NAFTA echo these themes, the risk assessment/risk management duality
provides a useful vehicle for analyzing the new trade disciplines. Thus,
both the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA texts on sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures specify that domestic regulations must be based on a risk
assessment.6 7 Both these texts, as well as the NAFTA technical barriers
text (under which, as discussed above, a risk assessment is optional rather
than mandatory), then specify certain elements that must characterize the
risk assessment methodology employed. 68 The Uruguay Round SPS
Agreement requires "sufficient" scientific evidence.69 The texts require
that regulators consider, respectively, "available"70 or "relevant"7 ' scien-
tific evidence. Both the Uruguay Round and NAFTA texts on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures state that national regulatory authorities must take
into account international risk assessment methodologies. Neither the
Uruguay Round nor the NAFTA text appears, at least as an explicit matter,
to accommodate measures that are not adopted by technically expert reg-
ulatory authorities, but that instead are enacted directly by legislatures or
as a result of popular referenda without a formal risk assessment.
72
In the risk management phase, the texts expressly recognize the
importance of social value choices. This is somewhat clearer in the two
66.
[RIisk management... describes the process of evaluating alternative regulatory
actions and selecting among them. Risk management, which is carried out by
regulatory agencies under various legislative mandates, is an agency decision-
making process that entails consideration of political, social, economic, and
engineering information with risk-related information to develop, analyze, and
compare regulatory options and to select the appropriate regulatory response
to a potential chronic health hazard. The selection process necessarily requires
the use of value judgments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the
reasonableness of the costs of control.
NATIONAL RESEARcH COUNCIL, supra note 64, at 18-19.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 53.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 41, 54.
69. Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, supra note 4, para. 6.
70. Id. para. 17.
71. NAFMA, supra note 2, art. 715, para. 1(a).
72. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH
& SA rrn §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1992) (citizen-sponsored initiative at subnational level in
United States which requires manufacturers to warn consumers that a product contains
a known carcinogen). Although this law was adopted by popular referendum, its imple-
mentation relies on scientific criteria for identifying potential reproductive and cancer
hazards and for determining whether those hazards contribute to an identifiable excess
risk.
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NAFTA passages, which explicitly identify each party's right to establish its
own levels of protection.73 Similarly, the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement
repeatedly acknowledges the significance of an appropriate level of sani-
tary or phytosanitary protection in excess of that implicit in international
standards.7 4 In contrast to the scientific process of risk assessment, which
is subject to trade disciplines of varying degrees of rigor in the Uruguay
Round and the NAFIA texts, those passages by and large leave the choice
of a national level of protection-i.e., the endpoint of the regulatory pro-
cess reflecting social value choices-to each contracting party. But both
texts specify that the choice of level of protection should be responsive to
the objective of minimizing negative trade effects.
As discussed above, scientific considerations play a relatively smaller
role in risk management than in risk assessment.75 Similarly, although
both the new Uruguay Round and NAFTA texts on standards establish
trade disciplines governing choice of regulatory measures, the require-
ments for that stage are not as a general matter based on scientific tests.
For instance, the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement specifies that sanitary
and phytosanitary measures must be "necessary for the protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health," must be "applied only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health," must
not "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where iden-
tical or similar conditions prevail," must not "be applied in a manner
which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade," and
may not be "more trade restrictive than required to achieve [a WTO mem-
ber's] appropriate level of protection, taking into account technical and
economic feasibility."76 The application of these requirements does not
address the scientific underpinnings for a national regulatory require-
ment. Instead, these tests target the choice by national regulatory authori-
ties among a variety of potential measures, as determined by such factors
as the following: impacts on international trade, discriminatory effect,
economic efficiency and technical feasibility, and the relationship between
the regulatory goal and the measure chosen.
Overall, a number of generalizations can be made concerning the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA TBT and SPS texts. First, the disciplines in
the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement are not based on science. Second,
while the analogous text in the NAFTA does allude to scientific principles
concerning risk assessments, the performance of risk assessments is
optional under that agreement. Of the two texts that require mandatory
risk assessments grounded in science as an express condition of the valid-
73. NAFMA, supra note 2, art. 712, para. 2 & art. 904, para. 2.
74. Uruguay Round SPSAgreemenA supra note 4, Preamble para. 6, paras. 11, 14, 18,
19, 20, 21, 29, 32, 41 & Annex B, para. 2.1(c).
75. Some would say that this is necessarily so, because the boundary between risk
assessment and risk management is not inherent, but socially "constructed." See, e.g.,
SHEiLAJAsANoFF, THE FiFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADvISERs As PoLIcrmAKEPs 12-13 (1990);
Brian Wynne, Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority, in EXPERT Evi-
DENCE: INTERPRETNG SCIENCE IN THE LAw 23 (Roger Smith & Brian Wynne eds., 1989).
76. See supra note 42.
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ity of a national regulatory measure, the Uruguay Round and NAFTA SPS
texts,
* both express a preference for internationally harmonized standards,
which are presumptively valid if applied by a party to the agreement;
* both apply scientific tests to national measures more stringent than inter-
national standards; however, the NAFTA SPS passage is somewhat clearer
on the absolute right of a party to adopt more stringent measures by ref-
erence to its chosen level of protection;
" both appear to segment the scientific underpinnings for a standard (risk
assessment) from the choice of regulatory measure (risk management),
with the NAFMA text being somewhat clearer in this regard by compari-
son with the Uruguay Round's juxtaposition of "scientific justification"
and appropriate level of protection;
" both require consideration of applicable international risk assessment
methodologies;
" only the Uruguay Round Agreement articulates a requirement that a
national measure be based on "sufficient" scientific evidence;
* both define a level of protection reflecting social value judgments as a
public policy choice made by each individual contracting party, with the
NAFMA text somewhat more explicit that the choice of level is to be
independent of scientific considerations;
* both require the consideration of adverse trade effects in the national
choice of level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection;
* neither, as a general matter, purports to subject the risk management
phase of the regulatory process to science-based disciplines;
" the NAFTA text, by comparison with the Uruguay Round SPS Agree-
ment's definition of "scientific justification," is somewhat more explicit in
confining the scientific disciplines strictly to the risk assessment process
and establishing that the choice of level of protection and selection of
regulatory measures are independent of scientific considerations.
B. Scientific Uncertainty
The tasks of both risk assessment and risk management are complicated by
uncertainty and lack of data that characterize much of the scientific basis
for regulation. According to a former Administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency:
From its earliest days, (the United States Environmental Protection Agency]
was often compelled to act under conditions of substantial scientific uncertainty.
[T]he problem of uncertainty was moved from the periphery to the center.
For [some] substances-and these are the ones that naturally figure most
prominently in public debate-the data remain ambiguous.77
Because science is incomplete, the scientific data set underlying any
regulation is necessarily incomplete. That, however, does not diminish
the scientific nature of the inquiry. Indeed, the appropriate handling of
uncertainties is part of the scientific process of risk assessment.
77. Ruckelshaus, supra note 62, at 19, 25-26 (emphasis in original).
Cornell International Law Journal
In response to the challenge of prescribing regulatory requirements
under conditions of uncertainty, a precautionary approach has begun to
gain fairly wide acceptance on the supranational and international levels.
The "precautionary principle" counsels governmental authorities to err on
the side of environmental protection in formulating public policy in con-
texts characterized by conditions of scientific uncertainty. 78 Precautionary
approaches can be interpreted as a counterweight to, if not an outright
rejection of, "wait and see" philosophies that emphasize a high degree of
scientific certainty as a precondition to adopting policy responses.79
Various formulations of a precautionary approach can be found in
such instruments as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment,80 the United Nations climate convention adopted in 1992,81 and
the Treaty of Rome8 2 as amended by the Single European Act.83 The
principle has been elaborated with particular detail in the Paris Commis-
sion 84 and the North Sea Conferences.8 5 There is, however, no universally
78. See generally Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle,
ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1991, at 4;James Cameron &Juli Abouchar, The Precautionay Prin-
ciple: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment,
14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1991); Lothar Gfindling, The Status in International
Law of the Principle of Precautionay Action, in THE NORTH SEA: PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 23 (David Freestone & Ton IjIstra eds., 1990) (special
issue of 5 INT'LJ. ESTUARINE AND COASTAL LAW); Ellen Hey, The Precautionay Concept in
Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEo. INT'L ENvrL. L. Rzv. 303
(1992); Bernard A. Weintraub, Note, Science, International Environmental Regulation, and
the Precautionay Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENvTL. LJ. 173
(1992).
79. See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray & David B. Rivkin,Jr., A "No Regrets"Environmental Pol-
icy, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1991, at 47 (article by Counsel to former U.S. President
Bush and Associate General Counsel to U.S. Department of Energy emphasizing scien-
tific uncertainty in global warming debate).
80. Rio Declaration on Environment and Developmen U.N. Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), 31
I.L.M. 876 (1992) ("In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.").
81. Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, art. 3, para. 3, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) ("The Parties should take pre-
cautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures . . . ").
82. TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter Treaty
of Rome).
83. Single European Act, art. 25, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1,11, 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986)
(adding to the Treaty of Rome art. 130r, para. 2, specifying that "[aiction ... relating to
the environment shall be based on the [principle] that preventive action should be
taken.. ").
84. See Paris Commission Recommendation 89/1 on the Principle of Precautionary
Action, June 22, 1989, reprinted in THE NORTH SEA: BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS ON
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CO-OPERATION 152 (David Freestone & Ton Ijlstra eds.,
1991) [hereinafter FREESTONE & IJLSTRA]
([T]he contracting parties . . . [a]ccept the principle of safeguarding the
marine ecosystem of the Paris Convention area by reducing at source polluting
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agreed formulation for the precautionary principle.8 6
Through the central theme of sustainable development, the Uruguay
Round may well have incorporated the precautionary principle into the
international trade regime more generally. The Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, one of the principal products of the Uru-
guay Round, refers to "optimal use of the world's resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development."87 Sustainable develop-
ment was the principal theme of the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development-the "Earth Summit-held in Rio dejaneiro,
Brazil in June 1992. The Rio Declaration8 8 suggests that the precaution-
ary principle is an essential component of sustainable development.8 9
Thus, one can interpret the Uruguay Round as endorsing the application
of this principle as an element of the international trade regime. Indeed,
one may even view the more specific Uruguay Round and NAFTA trade
disciplines on standards, including sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as
codifying a precautionary approach. Contrary to the treatment of many
environmental issues in GATT 1947,90 the new SPS texts explicitly
emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate by
the use of the best available technology and other appropriate measures. This
applies especially when there is reason to assume that certain damage or harm-
ful effects on the living resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such
substances, even when there is no scientific evidence to prove a casual link
between the emissions and effects ("The principle of precautionary action").).
See generally Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, Feb. 21, 1974, arts. 15-18, 13 I.L.M. 352, 361-64 (creating Commission). See
also G.C. Dec. 15/27, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 25, at 152, U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989),
reprinted in 19 ENvTh. POL'Y & L. 130 (1989)
(Recognizing that waiting for scientific proof regarding the impact of pollu-
tants discharged into the marine environment may result in irreversible dam-
age to the marine environment and in human suffering, . . . the [UNEP]
Governing Council recommends that all the governments adopt the 'principle
of precautionary action' as the basis of their policy with regard to prevention
and elimination of marine pollution).
85. See e.g., Ministerial Declaration of the Third International Conference on the
Protection of the North Sea (the Hague), Mar. 8, 1990, reprinted in FREESTONE & IJLSTRA,
supra note 84, at 3 (pledging to "continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is
to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent,
toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a
casual link between emissions and effects"); Ministerial Declaration of the Second Inter-
national Conference of the North Sea (London), Nov. 25, 1987, reprinted in FREESToNE
& IJxstRA, supra, at 40 ("in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging
effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which
may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has
been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence").
86. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, a distinction is made between the "precaution-
ary principle," some formulations of which might be taken to reject the validity of scien-
tific analyses, and a "precautionary approach," which is explicitly grounded in science
and risk assessment.
87. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral [World] Trade Organization, supra note 24,
preamble, para. 1.
88. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development supra note 80.
89. Id.
90. See supra part I.A.
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acknowledge each state's right to establish its own level of protection. 91
There is no accepted quantitative methodology that prescribes those
scientific inferences or regulatory outcomes that are appropriate under
conditions of incomplete or unavailable information.92 Indeed, it is very
likely impossible to imagine a numerical calculus for anticipating the
wholly unexpected or predicting the unpredictable. Instead, the realm of
scientific uncertainty requires the exercise of judgment and discretion,
both scientific and regulatory. Accordingly, the increasing acceptance of
precautionary approaches as an international norm in international trade
agreements and elsewhere strongly supports the validity of applying con-
servative assumptions in the absence of empirical data, as in estimating low
dose cancer risks.
I. Science and the Trade Dispute Settlement Process
The quasi-adjudicatory GATT dispute settlement process, as modified and
codified in the context of the newly established World Trade Organiza-
tion, applies to environmental and public health standards, including
those governed by the Uruguay Round SPS and TBT agreements. The
NAFTA dispute settlement process, with certain embellishments set out in
the following discussion, is patterned in its basic outlines on the GATT
model.
Briefly, the GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms first encourage
contracting parties to the agreement to settle differences through consul-
tation and negotiation, 93 an approach that can be expected to result in
successful resolution of a significant number of disagreements. If that
mechanism proves fruitless, an aggrieved party may submit a complaint to
the GATT Council, which can designate a panel of three independent
91. See supra notes 28, 49 and accompanying text.
92. Risk assessments consequently may be fraught with uncertainty:
Virtually all elements of risk assessment are clouded with uncertainty, basically
of two kinds. First, the various scientific disciplines involved in assessing risk are
not sufficiently developed either to explain the mechanisms by which particular
causes produce particular effects or to provide good quantitative estimates of
cause-and-effect relationships. Second, the data needed to analyze particular
risks are usually not available.
THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK CONTROL 5 (1985). Uncer-
tainties in a risk assessment, which may or may not be explicitly identified, can signifi-
cantly affect risk management decisions:
The current trend toward distinguishing risk assessment from risk manage-
ment has concealed... problems [of scientific uncertainty] and exacerbated
them. Yet, how they are resolved may influence policy choices for the risk man-
ager. If the manager fails to understand how these issues [involving scientific
uncertainty] were resolved in a specific risk assessment, it limits his understand-
ing of his options. At present,.., there is no definitive scientific resolution for
[certain] issues. Their treatment is properly at the interface of risk assessment
and risk management, an interface which the artificial segregation of these
activities makes increasingly difficult to define and analyze.
Silbergeld, supra note 63, at 59.
93. GATT 1947, supra note 3, art. XXII (consultation). See generally PiaaR PES-
CATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GAT DispuT SETTLENT (1991).
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experts appointed in their personal capacities to hear the dispute. In
practice, panel members are often national officials responsible for inter-
national trade matters at GATT headquarters in Geneva. Panel members
may not be representatives of any of thedisputing parties. After receiving
written submissions from both sides and from any other GATT member
states whose interests are affected, the panel issues a report, which may
find that actions of the respondent that are inconsistent with the agree-
ment have "nullified or impaired" the aggrieved party's GATT rights.
94
A. Adjudicating Scientific Controversies
Adjudication of scientific questions has been the subject of considerable
controversy and disagreement. It is by no means apparent that, as a gen-
eral matter, the direct application of scientific principles in the regulatory
process is amenable to full, de novo review in an adversarial setting. To the
contrary, experience strongly suggests that the adjudication by a third
party of scientific matters that arise in a regulatory setting, in which pre-
sumably expert technical authorities have already made scientific determi-
nations, should be limited within clearly defined parameters that control
and circumscribe the scope of that review.
First, scientists often disagree among themselves, especially on issues
at the cutting edge of regulatory policy that may involve considerable sci-
entific uncertainty.95 Even in the supposedly strictly technical process of
risk assessment, there may be considerable conflict among scientists.96
94. See generally Rosine Plank, An UnofficialDesaiption of How a GATPanel Works and
Does No 4J. INT'L ARB. 53 (1987).
95. As a former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has noted:
Science is only orderly after the fact; in process, and especially at the advanc-
ing edge of some field, it is chaotic and fiercely controversial. Thus, the expec-
tation built into environmental law, that science can provide definitive answers
to the kinds of questions that policymakers are obliged to ask under the terms
of that law, will be disappointed to the degree that such answers derive from the
forward edge of research.
Nor can we order a consensus in the areas of greatest interest to environmen-
tal policy- pollutant exposure and effects. Policymakers, including me, have
often deplored the tendency of scientific panels to engage in interminable
debate rather than reach the agreement that was clearly indicated on the invita-
tion. Of course scientists will disagree on issues involving the advancing edge of
research; that is what they do for a living. And even if we could somehow get a
group of scientists to endorse a consensus position, it would be, in the first
place, only tentative and subject to revision with the arrival of new discoveries;
and in the second place, it may be entirely wrong.
In science, the majority does not rule, as the history of science amply
demonstrates.
Ruckelshaus, supra note 62, at 24 (emphasis in original). Indeed, these propositions
are regarded in some quarters as axiomatic or tautological. See, e.g., DAVID COtUIN-
GRIDGE & CoLIN REEVE, SCIENCE SPA.Ks TO Powax THE RoLE OF EXPERTS IN PoUCY
MAKINc (1986).
96.
[S]ome people in the regulated community believe that the structure of risk
assessment inherently exaggerates risk, while many environmentalists believe
that it will not capture all the risk that may actually exist. ... [T]his disagree-
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 27
Social value choices necessarily intrude into the analysis of physical phe-
nomena by means of risk assessment methodologies through the selection
of inferences and assumptions.9 7 Consequently, there is unlikely to be a
single, unique way to analyze even the purely scientific significance of much
empirical data.98 As a result, in a regulatory context science may be least
helpful when there is a genuine scientific dispute.
In this dynamic setting, the scientific peer review process operating in
a regulatory context can reduce disagreement, identify gaps and holes,
and articulate the need for further investigation. Scientific peer review is
not fundamentally adjudicatory, but more "conciliatory," involving a some-
times protracted give and take among experts. Significantly, scientific
peer review does not anticipate the sort of bipolar, "yes or no" result con-
templated by an adjudicatory process. Instead, peer review is responsive to
a characterization of science as an ongoing search for knowledge against a
constantly shifting and evolving background that by its very nature is
always operating at new frontiers. On the other hand, peer review in a
regulatory setting may also engage disputed, value-laden questions of sci-
ence policy99 and may be unresponsive to the development of new scien-
ment is not resolvable in the short run through recourse to science. Risk assess-
ment is necessarily dependent on choices made among a host of assumptions,
and these choices will inevitably be affected by the values of the choosers,
whether they be scientists, civil servants, or politicians.
Ruckelshaus, supra note 62, at 28.
97. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing science policy).
98. As an example, because the analysis of those data requires the application of
certain scientific assumptions, hypotheses, and theories, the empirical data set underly-
ing the establishment of a pesticide tolerance does not necessarily yield a single regula-
tory result in the form of a residue limitation on foodstuffs. For instance, the following
observations have been made concerning the establishment of maximum residue limits
(MRLs) and acceptable daily intakes (ADIs) for pesticides by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission by comparison with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
approach:
Even when the same data package is used, data may be interpreted differently,
resulting in different scientific opinions on where to set MRLs or ADIs. Such
differences may be legitimate, because data used to establish an ADI or MRL
are often based on test results that provide estimates or ranges of effects. Dif-
ferent levels within a certain range may, in fact, be similar but they are trans-
lated into a proposed standard that is defined as a point estimate, the
maximum in the case of an MRL.
Another difference in data interpretation is the consideration of outliers or
extreme values from residue test data. Differences of opinion exist about
whether or not outliers should be incorporated into the setting of MRLs or
excluded because of the small likelihood they would occur as a result of pesti-
cide uses. The EPA tends to include outliers to a greater extent than the
[Codex].
Also, there can be differences of opinion concerning the level of the safety
factor to use in setting ADIs. Even when Codex and U.S. reviewers arrive at the
same threshold value specifying the no observed effects level, a different ADI
level can result because different safety factors are employed.
INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 29, at 23.
99. See, e.g.,JAsANoFF, supra note 75, at 61-83 (questioning validity of scientific peer
review process).
1994 The Role of Science
tific methodologies that, while lacking general acceptance, may
nonetheless be reliable.
An additional issue arises when decision-makers in an adjudicatory
setting, such as the members of GATT panels, are lay persons and not
technical experts who are specially trained in the scientific discipline rele-
vant to a particular dispute. Although the text of the GATI does not
require panels to give particular weight to conclusions of national authori-
ties, a structure in which the members of reviewing panels are generalists
may well suggest, or even require, an implicit principle of deference to
governmental decision-making processes. Presumably for precisely this
reason, domestic courts in the GATT countries of France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, each of which has a relatively
well-developed regulatory infrastructure in the areas of environment and
public health, rarely, if ever, directly scrutinize the fundamental "correct-
ness" of the conclusions drawn by technical experts from empirical mea-
surements. Rather, those tribunals tend much more to supervise the
processes or methodologies employed by regulatory authorities in reach-
ing scientific conclusions from raw data. 10 0 Even then, there is a well-
embedded notion in each of these legal systems calling for considerable
deference to the informed judgment of technical experts to avoid a situa-
tion in which a tribunal of non-scientists might substitute its own judg-
ment for that of scientific professionals. Similarly, municipal tribunals
have been reluctant to second-guess regulatory authorities under condi-
tions of scientific uncertainty.10
100. See RONALD BiucmAN Er AL., CONTROLUNG CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGU-
LATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 112-15 (1985) (arguing that the United
States is much more aggressive in judicially reviewing regulators' methodology than any
other country). See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) ("[A] reviewing court must remember that the [expert
administrative agency] is making predictions, within its area of expertise, at the fron-
tiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to
simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.") A
recent case in the U.S. Supreme Court appears to urge greater judicial activism in
reviewing the validity of scientific evidence, but nonetheless the Court emphasized that:
The inquiry envisioned [in determining the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony] is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scien-
tific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the princi-
ples that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993). That case,
moreover, did not involve judicial review of a technically expert agency's regulatory
decision. See generally JASANoFI, supra note 75, at 49-57 (analyzing judicial review of
science policy in the United States and noting three key elements: (1) acceptance of
decisions of technically expert regulatory authorities even on the basis of imperfect
knowledge or under conditions of uncertainty; (2) acceptance of decisions of techni-
cally expert regulatory authorities as valid even if not universally accepted in the scien-
tific community; and (3) acceptance of the resolution of scientific disagreements by
technically expert regulatory authorities).
101. In a seminal case, for example, a leading court in the United States opined as
follows:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by,
uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,
Cornell International Law Journal
Even when the 'judges" are scientists, there are considerable impedi-
ments to the adjudication of scientific "facts." Significantly, about 25 years
ago a recommendation surfaced in the United States calling for the crea-
tion of "science courts." The science court proposal anticipated an adver-
sarial approach to resolving disputes concerning scientific questions in the
policy-making process. Accordingly, contested questions of "scientific
fact" were to be isolated from the larger regulatory process, and particu-
larly from social value choices. An adjudicatory tribunal composed of
independent, objective scientists would resolve these questions. 10 2 That
proposal is now generally regarded as impracticable precisely because
many scientific issues are not inherently "justiciable" in such an adjudica-
tory, adversarial setting.10 3
the regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision that of
an expert administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of
cause and effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary
purpose of the statute is to be served.
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc).
102. See, e.g., Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances
in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 Sci. 654
(1976), reprinted in 4 RisKc ISSUES IN HEALTH & SArrrv 179 (1993).
103. For a sampling of the voluminous writing on science courts, much of it critical,
seeJon R. Cavicchi, The Science Court: A Bibliography, 4 RISK: IssuES IN HEALTH & SAFETY
171 (1993). Even in the context of carcinogenic risk assessment, where scientific meth-
odologies are relatively highly developed, disagreements about such questions as funda-
mental as statistical significance of empirical data and sufficiency of the scientific
evidence may mean that a particular dispute is not amenable to adjudication. See Carl
F. Cranor, Science Courts, Evidentiary Procedures and Mixed Science-Policy Decisions, 4 RISK:
ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 113 (1993). Cf Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, supra note 4,
para. 6 (specifying that sanitary and phytosanitary measures must "not [be] maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence"). Similarly, a review of the activities of a science
advisory panel on pesticides convened under the auspices of the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency concludes that "[t]he science court mode of operation, in
short, has severe drawbacks. In practical terms there is little or no chance that a science
court could definitively settle the issues in cases of intense controversy, and certainly
not in a timely fashion." BRucE L.R. SMiTH, THE ADvISERS: ScIENrnsr's IN THE Pouacv
PROCESS 72 (1992).
One of the members of the Presidential task force on the science court, see supra note
102, a self-described "agnostic about the value of an institutionalized court," concludes
based on empirical simulations that science courts could be useful in segmenting scien-
tific questions from policy preferences and in narrowing the range of scientific disa-
greement. Ultimately, however, the central impediment of scientific uncertainty would
prevent the definitive resolution of most scientific questions of any interest to the regu-
latory process:
[T]he few scientific claims upon which adversaries continued to disagree have
always been unresolvable with the present state of knowledge, usually because
suitable data were lacking. This has always become apparent to us during the
process, and I assume thatjudges evaluating such cases would realize it too. But
if science court judges would inevitably be confronted by questions that they
cannot answer for lack of data, so that their reports would predictably read,
"not answerable with the current state of knowledge," then what function is
served by thejudges? This reasoning leads me to a surprising conclusion: There
is no need for a panel ofjudges to decide which adversary is correct because, most
likely, neither adversary will be clearly correct. If I were reformulating the sci-
ence court proposal today, I would leave out the judges, making it in effect a
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In an environmental or public health context, the adjudication of
"scientific facts" may be particularly difficult precisely because of the diffi-
culty, if not impossibility, of demonstrating that an environmental contam-
inant or pollutant is safe or has no effect from a scientific point of view.
10 4
In such a situation, the allocation of burden of proof alone may be disposi-
tive of the result. Another significant drawback to the science court
approach in a regulatory setting is the possibility or, indeed, inevitability
that resolution of scientific disputes with public policy implications will
involve not only purely scientific questions, but also science policy
judgments.10 5
B. Science in Trade Agreements Prior to the Uruguay Round and the
NAFTA
Presumably because it contains no reference to science, GATT 1947
embodies no express requirement for deference to the determinations of
scientific experts. One very important dispute, which was the subject of a
1989 panel report'0 6 applying GATT principles under the U.S.-Canadian
bilateral free trade agreement,' 0 7 suggests the extent to which panels may
substitute their own judgment for that of scientific experts. This panel
report is noteworthy for: its intrusive review of the exercise of expert scien-
tific judgment by national regulatory authorities; its lack of deference to
science-based decisions of technically-oriented policy-makers; its willing-
ness to substitute the panel's own judgment for the numerical determina-
tions of governmental experts based on the panel's own reading of
scientific texts; and its relatively limited appreciation of the significance of
scientific uncertainty in the regulatory process, which leads to an adjudica-
tory review that is exactly contrary to that prescribed by precautionary
approaches.
An earlier dispute settlement panel proceeding in the GATT had
determined that Canada's requirement that all salmon and herring caught
mediation process. This ought to satisfy critics who fear that the court would
become authoritarian. It is enough for the adversaries, with the aid of a refe-
ree, to work out in clear language the relevant scientific points upon which they
do and do not agree. That, I suggest, would be useful information for policy
makers, journalists and the interested public.
Allan Mazur, The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH &
SAFETY 161, 165, 168 (1993) (emphasis in original). Significantly, this reformulated
proposal bears much greater resemblance to the scientific peer review process as part of
a continuous search for knowledge that is constantly changing than to an adjudicatory,
adversarial process. See also SheilaJasanoff, Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science, 4 RrsK:
ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 143 (1993) (arguing that an approach similar to the science
court proposal would be less useful than procedures more sensitive to the distinctive
characteristics of regulatory science).
104. See STONEHOUSE & MUMFORD, supra note 65.
105. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing science policy).
106. In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, Panel No. CDA-
89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, USCIFTA file) [hereinafter CUSFTA
Salmon and Herring Panel Report].
107. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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in Canadian waters be processed in Canada was inconsistent with the
GATT. 10 8 The United States then challenged new Canadian regulations
requiring that all commercial harvests of roe herring and five species of
salmon caught commercially in Canadian waters, including that intended
for export from Canada, be off-loaded or "landed" in Canadian territory.
The panel concluded that the effect of the "landing" requirement consti-
tuted an impermissible export restriction contrary to article XI of GATT
1947.109
The panel then considered the availability of GATT 1947's exception
in article XX(g) for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources," incorporated by reference into the bilateral instru-
ment."10 The binational panel, referring to GATT jurisprudence, con-
cluded that a measure must be primarily aimed at conservation to qualify
for this exemption." 1 In applying this test, the panel suggested that rela-
tively little deference should be given to national determinations regard-
ing the desirability or utility of a particular measure. Instead, the panel
stated that it
must examine the objective factors that go into a decision to adopt such a
measure, including the conservation benefits that the measure itself would
produce and whether there is a genuine conservation reason for choosing
the actual measure in question as opposed to others that might accomplish
the same objective. 112
Among other things, the United States challenged Canada's asserted
need to "land" one hundred percent of commercially-taken herring and
salmon, including all catches intended for exportation from Canada, as a
108. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, supra note
13. This report addressed a challenge by the United States to a previous ban on the
export of herring and salmon from Canada. The GATr panel concluded that this
"processing in Canada" requirement was an export restriction in contravention of arti-
cle XI of GATT 1947 and was not primarily aimed at conservation; therefore, it was not
justified by article XX(g). See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. After adoption
by the GATT Council of this report, Canada removed the export ban and replaced it
with the "landing" requirement, which was designed to achieve similar conservation
and management goals and was subsequently challenged by the United States under
the auspices of the bilateral agreement
109. CUSFTA Salmon and HerringPanelReport, supra note 106, para. 6.13. Article XI of
GATT 1947 is incorporated by reference in CUSFTA art. 407.
110. CUSFTA, supra note 47, art 1201.
111. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
112. CUSFTA Salmon and Herring Panel Report, supra note 106, para. 7.08. Similarly,
the panel inferred an unstated, implied test under article XX(g) that turns on the bal-
ance of costs and benefits of the challenged measure, taking into account the regula-
tory burdens to foreign commercial interests. The desirability or utility of a disputed
national regulatory requirement, according to the report, is then subject to reevalua-
tion by panels based on this cost-benefit criterion. Consequently, the panel must deter-
mine "whether the government would have been prepared to adopt that measure if its
own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the measure." Id. paras. 7.09-.10. This
aspect of the panel's decision has been criticized as an "idealistic but dubious proposi-
tion" and "a mode of analysis so inherently subjective" that it "leaves environmental
regulations vulnerable to a broad array of challenges." Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the
Environmental Exceptions in GATTArtide XX 25J. WoRLD TRADE 37, 50-51 (1991).
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regulatory vehicle for assuring high-quality biological data concerning har-
vests and stocks of those species. The panel reviewed authorities on statis-
tics and determined "on the basis of logical analysis"" 3 and with the aid of
texts on the science of fisheries that "reliable sampling data can be
obtained without requiring access to 100% of the catch." 114 Acknowledg-
ing that scientific uncertainty would increase as sample size decreased 1 5
and that "the choice of a particular percentage figure would be to a cer-
tain extent arbitrary,"" 6 the panel nonetheless observed that "it is never
easy to justify imposing tangible burdens for the purpose of avoiding
uncertain risks."" 7
Consequently, the panel concluded that sampling of no more than
eighty to ninety percent of the total catch would be necessary to achieve
the conservation purposes of the landing requirement." 8 Therefore,
"Canada's insistence on the necessity of access to 100% of the catch was
not supportable."" 9 Although the panel may have been correct that Can-
ada's "landing" requirement was protectionist in both intent and effect,
the report's stated reasoning places heavy emphasis on the panel's own
second-guessing of the "correctness" of the judgment of expert Canadian
regulatory authorities - an approach that may have unfortunate implica-
tions in future disputes concerning the scientific validity of national regu-
latory measures when challenged by reference to the newly-established
trade disciplines in the Uruguay Round and NAFIA SPS texts.
Other trade dispute settlement panels have been less intrusive and
more deferential to national scientific determinations. In another recent
decision, 120 also under the auspices of the Canada-U.S. bilateral agree-
ment, Canada challenged a prohibition by the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, a sub-national entity in the United States, on importation of ultra-
high temperature (UHT) milk from the Canadian province of Qu6bec.
113. CUSFTA Salmon and Herring Panel Repor4 supra note 106, para. 7.21.
114. Id. para. 7.29.
115. Id. para. 7.22. According to the panel report,
Canada placed considerable emphasis on the need for stratification of sam-
pling-the practice of sometimes dividing the populations to be sampled into
smaller sub-populations according to characteristics such as the dates fished,
the gear used, and the sub-area within which the fishery took place. With cer-
tain catch populations being divided into smaller sub-populations, there would
be a greater chance that unlanded exports might be concentrated in a particu-
lar sub-population. This concentration could increase the size of the export
share to a point where it was too large to omit from sampling altogether.
Id.
116. Id. para. 7.34.
117. Id. para. 7.37.
118. Id. paras. 7.34, 7.40. Moreover, averred the panel, a consideration of the costs
and benefits to both Canadian and U.S. nationals demonstrated that "the conservation
benefits and other advantages that would have been derived from a landing require-
ment applicable to 100% of the salmon and herring catch would not have justified its
adoption as a conservation measure." Id. para. 7.38. See supra note 112.
119. CUSFTA Salmon and Herring Panel Repor4 supra note 106, para. 7.21.
120. In the Matter of Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of U.H.T.
Milk from Quebec, United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review,
Panel No. USA-93-1807-01 (June 3, 1993) (on file with author).
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UHT milk is produced by treating fluid milk to a high temperature for a
specified period of time, such as 1380 C for at least two seconds. After
cooling to room temperature and aseptic packaging in hermetically sealed
containers, the shelf life of properly processed and handled UHT milk is
between six and twelve months at room temperature. 12'
This dispute centered on the question whether Qu6bec's technical
standards for processing UHT milk were equivalent to those of Puerto
Rico. The panel emphasized that
[s] tandard-setting is a significant prerogative of States. The issues posed by
standards are all the more important as the public becomes aware of the
need to protect public health through wise standards, governing products
and production processes. It is also clear to the Panel that standards have
an effect upon imported goods which cannot be ignored. In a global econ-
omy and a fortiori in the special context of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, cooperation and mutual consideration must be present if the
imperatives of free trade are to be reconciled with the imperatives of public
health. 12 2
The panel characterized the U.S. safety standards governing the
processing of UHT milk as a domestic measure and not a quantitative
restriction.123 Abstaining from any determination with respect to national
treatment, the panel noted that
the starting point of any analysis must be the principles of non-protection
and sovereignty which lie at the heart of Article III [of GAT 1947, incorpo-
rated by reference into the CUSFTA]. In the view of the Panel, Article III
affords broad discretion in the setting of health standards applicable to
imported products. The only qualification on the sovereign right of States
to impose such standards upon imported products is that these standards
must apply equally to domestic and to imported products and, secondly,
that they should not be applied in a manner calculated to afford protection
to domestic production. 12 4
Based on this high degree of deference to national regulatory choices, the
panel declined to conclude that the United States regulation violated the
bilateral agreement.125 At issue in this case, however, was an equivalence
determination, not the validity of Puerto Rico's underlying regulatory
requirements. Consequently, this precedent may be of limited applicabil-
ity in a case involving a direct challenge to the scientific legitimacy of a
national standard.
Other disputes that raise scientific questions have been resolved on
non-scientific grounds. Under the auspices of GATr, the United States
121. Id. para. 3.1.
122. Id. para. 5.2.
123. Id, paras. 5.7-.8.
124. Id. para. 5.14.
125. The panel did, however, find a "non-violation" nullification of Canada's reason-
able expectation that UHT milk, which had previously been imported from Canada,
would not be excluded from the U.S. market pending the outcome of ongoing bilateral
discussions concerning the extent to which Canadian UHT milk met the Puerto Rican
standard. Id. paras. 5.52-.63.
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challenged a ban by Thailand on the importation of foreign cigarettes
which, unlike the Canadian landing requirement, was discriminatory not
just in effect, but also on its face. The disputing parties agreed that ciga-
rette smoking constitutes a serious risk to human health. Thailand, how-
ever, argued that the distinction between foreign and domestic cigarettes
was justified by article XX(b) of GATT 1947, in part by the disparate
health impact of imported and domestically manufactured products. The
GATT panel rejected this argument, reasoning that all cigarettes, whatever
their origin, presented a serious health risk and that Thailand's public
health goals could consequently be accomplished in non-discriminatory
fashion. Consequently, the panel did not directly adjudicate the scientific
question whether American cigarettes did or did not present a greater risk
to smokers than those manufactured in Thailand.' 26
This case is of interest as apparently the only GATT dispute settle-
ment panel proceeding in which the opinion of a neutral outside expert
was sought. Thailand requested the panel to consult with competent
international organizations on technical aspects of the case, a request in
which the complainant, the United States, acquiesced. 127 The panel then
requested the World Health Organization (WHO) to present an expert
report on those issues. The report prepared by the WHO addressed
health effects from smoking, the increase in smoking in developing coun-
tries, the differences between American and Thai cigarettes and their pat-
terns of consumption in Thailand, the effects of opening closed cigarette
markets in other countries in Latin America and Asia, and public policy
strategies to reduce or deter smoking.128 Although the United States dis-
agreed with some of the conclusions of the WHO report, neither party
appears to have challenged the expertise or objectivity of its preparers.
The panel noted that "smoking constitute[s] a serious risk to human
health" and therefore falls within the scope of article XX(b).129 Although
the panel's decision did not ultimately turn on the technical questions
presented in the WHO's report, that information shaped the panel's anal-
ysis of how Thailand might control the demand and supply of cigarettes in
a manner consistent with its obligations under the GATIT. 30
The case law in the European Union is noteworthy precisely because
it does not address the role of scientific evidence, but instead concentrates
on a hierarchy of policy priorities and the validity of the motivation
behind the environmental measures through such doctrines as "propor-
tionality." In a case challenging Denmark's mandatory recycling program
for beer and soft drink containers, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities concluded without elaboration that the Danish scheme was
"an essential element of a system aiming to secure the re-use of containers
126. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note
12.
127. Id. para. 3.
128. I& paras. 51-57.
129. I& pam. 73.
130. Id. paras. 78-80.
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and therefore appears to be necessary to attain the [environmental] objec-
tives of the disputed regulations." i 13
The Court of Justice's approval of Denmark's mandatory recycling
scheme by and large reinforced the principle that each EU member state
may determine its own level of environmental protection. To facilitate the
recycling program, however, the Danish government required that beer
and soft drinks be marketed in one of not more than thirty containers
approved by Danish authorities. To accommodate foreign manufacturers,
the Danish scheme also permitted the sale of beer and soft drinks in
recyclable but unapproved containers. Because unapproved containers
added to the complexity of the governmentally established program, pro-
ducers utilizing unapproved containers were required to set up their own
recycling system and the total amount of beverages that could be mar-
keted in unapproved containers was subject to a limitation of 3,000 hecto-
liters per year. In considering a challenge to this numerical restriction the
Court ofJustice then held, similarly without embellishment, that this limit
on unapproved containers was disproportionate to the environmental
objective and therefore inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome.132
A recent case raised the question of whether a local municipality
within Belgium, another member state of the European Union, could
restrict the disposal of waste originating from other regions of Belgium or
from other EU member states.3SS After determining that the municipal-
ity's restrictions on hazardous waste were precluded by a Community
directive, the Court ofJustice concluded that waste not addressed by that
directive was an article in commerce governed by the Treaty of Rome.
Without examining the Belgian assertion of "a genuine threat to the envi-
ronment" in detail, the Court found that the relationship between the
challenged requirements and "the protection of the environment must be
regarded as well-founded." Moreover, the measures in question were held
not to be discriminatory with respect to non-hazardous waste because
in order to determine whether the obstacle in question is discriminatory,
the particular type of waste must be taken into account. The principle that
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source-a princi-
ple laid down by Article 130r(2) [of the Treaty of Rome] for action by the
Community relating to the environment-means that it is for each region,
commune or other local entity to take appropriate measures to receive, pro-
cess and dispose of its own waste. Consequently waste should be disposed
of as close as possible to the place where it is produced in order to keep the
transport of waste to the minimum practicable.' 3 4
131. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.R. 619, 631,
(1989), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 167 (1989).
132. Id, 1988 E.C.R. at 4632, 1 C.M.L.R. at 632, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 184
(1989). See generaly Marina Wheeler, Greening the EEC Treaty, in GREENING INTERNA-
TIONAL Law 85, 90-93 (Philippe Sands ed., 1993) (discussing Danish bottles case).
133. Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1 C.M.L.R. 265 (1993).
134. Id See generally Wheeler, supra note 132, at 93-96 (discussing Belgian waste case).
Contra Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 5.
Ct. 2009 (1992); Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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While it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from this small
number of cases, it is nonetheless possible to make several admittedly spec-
ulative observations. Disputes that involve scientific questions, including
all those discussed above, are also likely to raise non-scientific trade policy
questions. In some instances, like the Danish bottles and Belgian waste
cases in the European Court of Justice and the Thai cigarette dispute in
the GATT, depending on the rule of decision employed, the resolution of
scientific questions may not be necessary because the case is controlled by
other principles, such as proportionality, non-discrimination, or the prece-
dence given to the powers of subnational governmental units.
Other cases, such as Canada's "landing" requirement for unprocessed
salmon and herring, may invite or require resolution of scientific contro-
versies by a third party, such as a trade agreement dispute settlement
panel. With the emphasis on explicit science-based trade disciplines in the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA SPS texts, the number of disputes that fall in
this category can be expected to increase. Neither these passages nor the
text of GATT 1947 explicitly address the questions of "scope of review," or
the appropriate level of deference to scientific determinations by national
authorities. Moreover, those panel reports that implicitly engage this
question, principally those for the "landing" and UHT milk disputes
decided under the Canada-U.S. bilateral agreement, tend to imply con-
flicting answers. Taken together, these two cases may suggest a predisposi-
tion to greater deference in the context of regulations designed to protect
public health, such as those at issue in the UHT milk dispute, than in
situations involving preservation of the environment or natural resources,
as in the case concerning unprocessed salmon and herring. Because of
the lack of existing authority and the detailed new disciplines set out in
the recently adopted texts, an analysis of both national practice with
respect to science in the regulatory process and the context in which the
new science-based tests were adopted is helpful and perhaps, indeed,
necessary.
Deference to national regulatory judgments might under some cir-
cumstances be a "two-edged" sword, in that the decisions of national tech-
nical authorities might be insufficiently precautionary as well as excessively
stringent 13 5 However, given the "negative" structure of the current GATT
trade disciplines, at least in the area of environment and public health, the
trade agreement dispute settlement process can address only the latter
and not the former. Because trade agreements as currently structured
contain no minimum standards, panels may conclude that an excessively
strict national standard violates international obligations, but they have no
power to compel a government to strengthen measures that are unduly
135. Cf Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(requiring courts to defer to administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of statu-
tory standard).
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C. Dispute Settlement in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA
The emphasis on the integrity of the strictly scientific components of the
regulatory process in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA trade disci-
plines governing public health standards means that dispute settlement
panels established under either agreement may be called upon to evaluate
the validity of scientific analyses underlying national measures to protect
public health. Collecting relevant factual and scientific information may
be difficult for trade agreement dispute settlement panels, which have lim-
ited fact finding capability and no subpoena power.' 37
Presumably for this reason, revised dispute settlement procedures
adopted as part of the establishment of the new World Trade Organiza-
tion specify that "[w]ith respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or
other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request
an advisory report in writing from an expert review group."' 3 8 An "expert
review group" is established by the panel, presumably on an ad hoc basis,
and reports to the panel. Members of the expert review group are
independent personalities appointed in their individual capacities and
may not include either government officials of the parties to the dispute
or nationals of the disputing states, except with the concurrence of the
parties. Expert review groups may seek advice from "any source they deem
appropriate." An expert review group prepares a draft report, which is to
be made available to the parties to the dispute for comment, and a final
version, which is transmitted to the panel and "shall be advisory only."
The relevant text does not specify the number of members that may com-
prise expert review groups, which apparently may vary in size as appropri-
ate for particular disputes.' 3 9
The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement established a very similar pro-
cess, presumably an embellishment of a precursor in the earlier Tokyo
Round Standards Code, 140 in which the analogous institution is known as
a "technical expert group."141 However, these technical expert groups
may be established not only on the initiative of the panel itself, but also at
the request of any party to a dispute, an option which is not expressly
136. But cf Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, supra note 5, arts. 12, 33 (requiring minimum 50-year copy-
right protection and minimum 20-year patent protection, respectively).
137. See generally Plank, supra note 94.
138. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, GATT
Doc. MTN/FA II-A2 (Dec. 15, 1993) in Uruguay Round, supra note 1.
139. Id. app. 4.
140. Standards Cod4 supra note 15, art. 14, Annex 2 (establishing technical expert
groups). No technical expert group has ever been established pursuant to the Tokyo
Round Standards Code. Although the United States requested the establishment of a
technical expert group in connection with the beef hormone dispute with the Euro-
pean Union, such a group was never convened. See Froman, supra note 25, at 550;
Halpern, supra note 25, at 142-43.
141. Uruguay Round TBTAgreement, supra note 22, art. 14, Annex 2 (establishing tech-
nical expert groups).
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stated for expert review groups under other portions of the Uruguay
Round. 142 The NAFTA contains a comparable provision under which dis-
pute settlement panels can request a written report from a "scientific
review board" established either by the dispute settlement panel itself or at
the urging of a disputing party.143
A number of singular issues arise from the likelihood, given the struc-
ture of the new trade disciplines in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA
texts on standards, that the quasi-adjudicatory dispute settlement panels
will be obliged to review the scientific foundation for national regulatory
measures. The four texts expressly address none of the following three
central questions:
" To what extent, if at all, must panels defer to expert scientific judgment
underlying a national standard, especially if that judgment reflects minor-
ity or controversial views within the scientific community?1
" To what extent, if at all, must panels defer to expert scientific judgment
underlying a national standard when that judgment is exercised under
conditions of scientific uncertainty?14 5
* How should dispute settlement panels treat and structure requests for
expert scientific advice in addressing issues raised by the previous two
questions?
142. But cf. supra note 128 and accompanying text (parties to dispute concerning
restrictions on importation of and internal taxes on cigarettes agreed to expert submis-
sion by World Health Organization).
143. The NAFTA provides in article 2015 as follows:
Scientific Review Boards
1. On request of a disputing Party or, unless the disputing Parties disap-
prove, on its own initiative, the panel may request a written report of a scientific
review board on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or
other scientific matters raised by a disputing Party in a proceeding, subject to
such terms and conditions as such Parties may agree.
2. The board shall be selected by the panel from among highly qualified,
independent experts in the scientific matters, after consultations with the dis-
puting Parties and the scientific bodies set out in the Model Rules of Procedure
established pursuant to Article 2012(1).
3. The participating Parties shall be provided:
(a) advance notice of, and an opportunity to provide comments to the
panel on, the proposed factual issues to be referred to the board; and
(b) a copy of the board's report and an opportunity to provide comments
on the report to the panel.
4. The panel shall take the board's report and any comments by the Parties on the
report into account in the preparation of its report.
NAIFTA, supra note 2, art. 2015.
144. See, e.g.,John H.Jackson, World Trade Rules and EnvironmentalPolies: Congmence
or Conflict?, in TRADE AND ThE ENVIRONMENT. LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PoUcy 219, 234
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) ("the 'scope of review' of international GATT7/
[World Trade Organization] panels over national government regulatory decisions con-
cerning environment needs to be better defined"). See supra notes 37-38, 53 and accom-
panying text (definitions of "scientific justification" in Uruguay Round SPS Agreement
and "scientific basis" in NAFTA SPS text).
145. Cf supra notes 42,55 and accompanying text (Uruguay Round and NAFTA pro-
visions stating that sanitary and phytosanitary measures may be adopted on provisional
basis under conditions of uncertainty).
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D. Interpreting Science-Based Trade Disciplines in the Dispute
Settlement Process
Like the original GATT, the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA texts on stan-
dards contain no express instruction that dispute settlement panels must
accord scientific determination by national regulatory authorities some
measure of deference. Such a conclusion, however, is virtually ines-
capable. First, as discussed in part III.A above, allowing panels composed
of lay persons to substitute their judgment for that of technical experts
would tend to contradict policy and practice by municipal tribunals at the
national level, where courts have been hesitant to second-guess the resolu-
tion of questions of scientific "fact" by technically expert regulatory
authorities.
Second, to the extent that there is any evidence, the negotiating and
drafting histories of the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA demonstrate a
progressive relaxation in the rigor of the scientific tests. With respect to
the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, the interim 1991 Dunkel Draft
acknowledged that measures more stringent than international standards
were permissible, but subjected them to what might have been interpreted
as a rigid cause-and-effect relationship of "scientific justification."' 4 6
Although that term is retained in the final text, a clarifying footnote estab-
lishes that it is for individual governments to make a determination of
scientific justification on the basis of an examination and evaluation of
available scientific information. 147
There is reason to believe that changes in the NAFTA text on sanitary
and phytosanitary measures during the negotiation process were even
more significant. A document dated February 20, 1992, which purports to
be an interim negotiating draft of the NAFTA, was leaked to the press at
the end of March of that year. The authenticity of this document has not
been confirmed. 148 In any event, the leaked draft sets out a test of "scien-
tific justification" similar to that in the December 1991 Dunkel Draft for
those sanitary and phytosanitary measures which are more stringent than
international standards. This requirement has been eliminated altogether
in the final version of the NAFTA text. By comparison with the unoffi-
cially leaked interim text, the final text much more explicitly confirms
each party's right to establish its appropriate level of protection without
regard to scientific constraints. Similarly, the final text on technical barri-
ers was apparently modified by deleting a requirement that standards-
related measures be the least restrictive to trade or no more trade restric-
tive than necessary.
The United States has given the following official interpretation of
the role of science in the NAFTA SPS disciplines:
146. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
148. See Citizen Groups Say Leaked NAFTA Draft Would Undermine U.S. Standards, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 26, 1992) (quoting United States Government official as say-
ing she "had no way of saying whether the draft document is authentic").
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under the NAFTA, the requirement that measures be based on "scientific
principles" and not be maintained "where there is no longer a scientific
basis" do not involve a situation where a dispute settlement panel may substi-
tute its scientific judgment for that of the government maintaining the sani-
tary or phytosanitary measure. The question under the NAFTA in this
regard is whether the government maintaining the sanitary or phytosanitary
measure has "a scientific basis" for the measure. "Scientific basis" is defined
as "a reason based on data or information derived using scientific
methods."
The question is also not whether the measure was based on the "best"
science or the "preponderance" of science or whether there was conflicting
science. The question is only whether the government maintaining the
measure has a scientific basis for it. This is because [the NAFTA sanitary
and phytosanitary text] is based on a recognition that there is seldom, if
ever, scientific certainty and consequently any scientific determination may
require a judgment among differing scientific opinions. The NAFTA pre-
serves the ability of governments to continue to make those judgments.14 9
Although this is a unilateral interpretation subsequent to the conclusion
of the NAFTA negotiations, it does stand for the very general proposition
that the NAFTA, and by implication the analogous passages in the Uru-
guay Round, contain an implicit notion of deference to national scientific
determinations.
If some deference is necessary to national scientific determinations,
what can be said about the minimum level of scientific rationality that will
suffice to support a national measure? The best conclusion is that these
tests are the scientific analogue of a procedural, not a substantive, test.150
Although there may be weaknesses in peer review as a vehicle for validat-
ing the "correctness" of a scientific determination, 15 1 that process should
be adequate for assessing whether the inquiry that preceded a particular
conclusion has been minimally "scientific." Accordingly, any domestic sci-
entific determination that has withstood scientific peer review should be
categorically presumed to satisfy the science-based disciplines in either the
Uruguay Round or the NAFTA.
The absence of approval through a peer review process, however,
ought not to be dispositive. As discussed above, regulatory authorities
must often operate at the frontiers of scientific knowledge in advance of
general acceptance and in the face of disputes over science policy choices.
For those regulatory measures whose scientific support does not satisfy a
149. Statement of Administrative Action, North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, supra note 48, ch. 7, § B(A) (8) (c), at 542 (emphasis in original).
See also Letter from Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative, to John
Adams, Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense Council (Sept. 13, 1993),
reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept 17, 1993, at 5-6. See also Or-cE OF THE UNnTED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT ON U.S. FOOD SA urW AND THE URUGUAY ROUND:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS AND PROMOTING U.S. EXPORTS (1994) (analyzing Uruguay
Round SPS Agreement disciplines).
150. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797
(1993).
151. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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peer review test, a panel might consider the following questions in deter-
mining whether a challenged measure qualifies as minimally "scientific:"
* Was the adoption of the measure preceded by an attempt to gather
empirical data?
" Are the data characterized by any indicia of reliability-e.g.,
reproducibility?
" Do the principles underlying the attempts to gather empirical data, as
through toxicological tests, enjoy any following in the scientific
community?
* Are numerical conclusions, such as risk probabilities, based on calcula-
tions from empirical data?
* Are the assumptions made in performing the risk assessment disclosed?
" To assure consistency, is there evidence of the application of objective
principles that might govern a class of similar cases? For example, was
the risk assessment performed using assumptions or inference guidelines
that have been published or that have been utilized in other cases?
* Are the scientific conclusions as to effects sufficiently specific to permit
the adoption of a minimally coherent regulatory standard? For example,
if the concern is for birth defects, is there a finding of teratogenicity?
In distinguishing investigations of physical or natural phenomena charac-
teristic of the scientific method from other modes of analysis, it is not
necessary that each of these tests be satisfied. Rather, using guidelines
such as these, a panel should make a determination based on the specific
context of a particular challenged measure and the totality of the circum-
stances as to whether the measure is accompanied by an analysis that can
be objectively identified by the attribute "scientific."
The Uruguay Round and the NAMTA texts on sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures both require that a national measure be "based on a risk
assessment." As discussed in part IIA above, establishing regulatory
requirements after completion of a risk assessment is characteristic of risk
management. Although the risk management function can be and is sub-
ject to additional trade disciplines, those criteria are not grounded in sci-
ence. 152 Accordingly, this requirement ought to be satisfied if the
respondent government can point to a risk assessment-which, under
both agreements, apparently need not be a quantitative risk assessment-
that meets the tests set out above and that was prepared before, or con-
temporaneously with, the adoption of the measure.
The Uruguay Round SPS Agreement's requirement that a measure
not be "maintained without sufficient scientific evidence" 153 is somewhat
troubling. The use of the word "sufficient," which does not appear in the
corresponding passage in the NAFTA, might be taken to authorize panels
to review the adequacy of the scientific data underlying a measure in a
manner that is inconsistent with basic principles of adjudicatory review of
science in the regulatory process. In keeping with the above principles,
the best interpretation of this passage is probably that there is a need for a
minimal level of scientific evidence. With this perspective, panels would
152. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Vol 27
1994 The Role of Science
not have the wholesale power to substitute their judgment for that of
national authorities with respect to the adequacy of the scientific evidence.
Rather, panels could only ask whether the empirical data are minimally
adequate to support the national government's scientific conclusions.
An additional concern is the potential for dispute panels to second-
guess the relationship between the scientific support and the regulatory
measure chosen by national governmental authorities by demanding an
excessively high correlation between the two. Neither the Uruguay Round
nor the NAFTA SPS texts speak to whether empirical data must correlate
with regulated exposures, to whether uses from which data are obtained
must be identified with a high degree of particularity, or to the specificity
with which uses or exposures might be regulated based on particular
effects. For example, would data based on exposure to a substance by
inhalation support the regulation of this substance's ingestion? Would
data obtained from certain uses justify controls or bans on others? This
difficulty is particularly apparent in the case of the Uruguay Round SPS
Agreement, in which the scope of applicability of the scientifically-based
trade disciplines to the choice of regulatory measure is not entirely clear.
Presumably the texts constraining national regulatory powers over
sanitary and phytosanitary measures are not intended to disrupt numerous
regulatory schemes in place in many countries for such substances as
drugs, food additives, and pesticides,' 5 4 in which prior governmental
authorization is required before a substance may be manufactured, can
enter commerce, or may be employed for a particular use. Typically, such
frameworks require a private party applicant, such as a manufacturer, to
demonstrate that the substance meets a test of safety or the absence of
adverse effects. One way of looking at these requirements of prior
approval is as a particularized expression of a precautionary approach. 15 5
As suggested above, 156 such requirements can be quite rigorous from a
scientific point of view.
A refusal by regulatory authorities to approve a particular substance
or use of that substance will likely be based on the absence of sufficient
scientific support, due to the applicant's failure to meet the burden of
satisfying the statutory standard. In such a situation, the effect of the regu-
latory decision-the rejection of the application-may be a prohibition or
ban on the substance or use. Under such circumstances, however, it
would plainly be absurd to consider that prohibition to be a "measure"
within the meaning of the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA texts on sani-
tary and phytosanitary standards. 157 Otherwise, a successful challenge to
such a prohibition could be based upon the rejection of an application for
which no supporting data at all were supplied. This interpretation would
154. See, e.g., PESTICIDES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDUsrRIAuzED NATIONs' REGULA-
TORY SYsTEMs, supra note 40.
155. See supra part II.B.
156. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 23, 49 (definitions of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in
Uruguay Round and NAFTA texts).
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then produce the unlikely, if not absurd, result that the less extensive the
applicant's scientific support, the greater the likelihood of a successful
challenge.
Lastly, the prerogative created by the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA
for the establishment of expert review groups and scientific review boards
to provide the lay panel members with technical, scientific advice should
be exercised with great care. Absent greater precision in the delineation
of the composition, structure, powers, and procedures for these entities,
these innovations may very well do more harm than good.'58 For
instance, it is unclear whether and to what extent a dispute settlement
panel could request an expert review group or scientific review board to
review the assumptions, hypotheses, and theories-"science policy"
choices-on which a risk assessment is based. Although the reference to a
neutral expert in the Thai cigarette dispute' 5 9 appears to have been suc-
cessful, that model may have limited applicability in cases that involve
much more intense controversy about purely scientific questions at the
frontiers of human knowledge.
The notion of deference by one scientist to another's defensible, but
arguably incorrect, scientific determination is not necessarily well internal-
ized among the scientific community. The composition of these expert
groups is obviously crucial, but there is no requirement that the members
be broadly representative of the range of scientific thought on the ques-
tions posed. Nor is it apparent that such a requirement would have any
meaning in hotly contested disputes or with regard to issues at the edges
of scientific thought.
The potential for aberrant results is particularly high in the case of
the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, in which the scope of scientific
inquiry established by the text, as discussed above, is less than clear. For
example, that new agreement appears to invite an inquiry into the suffi-
ciency of the scientific evidence supporting a national regulatory measure.
Instead of encouraging an appropriate level of deference to science-based
determinations of national regulatory authorities, the availability of these
groups may falsely suggest that scientific questions are justiciable in an
adjudicatory and adversarial context.
Conclusion
The emphasis on science-based trade disciplines in the standards provi-
sions of the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA raises new challenges for
national public health regulatory authorities, for the international trade
regime, and especially for the trade agreement dispute settlement process.
The structure of these texts, the best thinking on the role of science in the
158. By contrast, the availability of environmental and public health policy expertise
through the choice of panelists with experience in that area-as distinct from members
of expert review groups and scientific review boards-may broaden the perspective of
individual panels in exercising their law-making functions and enhance panels' sensitiv-
ity to policy concerns other than international trade.
159. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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national regulatory process, considerations of scientific uncertainty, and
the negotiating histories of these agreements all suggest that dispute settle-
ment panels should be highly deferential to scientific determinations of
national authorities that underlie regulatory measures to protect the envi-
ronment and public health. This question of deference might well benefit
from explicit clarification by the relevant bodies under the World Trade
Organization-the newly established Committee on Trade and Environ-
ment or the relevant bodies under the SPS and TBT Agreements 16 0-and
the analogous institutions under the NAFTA,161 including the new North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation.'
62
160. See Uruguay Round SPSAgreement, supra note 4, para. 38 (establishing Committee
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures "to provide a regular forum for consultations");
Uruguay Round TBT Agreement supra note 22, art. 13.1 (establishing Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade "for the purpose of affording Members the opportunity of
consulting on any matters relating to the operation of this Agreement").
161. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 722 (establishing Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures to "facilitate... consultations on specific matters relating to
sanitary or phytosanitary measures"); id. art. 913 (establishing Committee on Standards-
Related Measures to "provid[e) a forum for the Parties to consult on issues relating to
standards-related measures").
162. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 8, 32 I.L.M. 1482, 1485 (1993) (establishing Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation).

